Past PDR Cases

08/21/2024

The First Court erred by creating a new Marin Category 1 prohibition and holding, in direct contradiction to Speth, that a defendant can complain for the first time on appeal about payments ordered as conditions of community supervision.

06/05/2024

“The court of appeals erred in its interpretation of Tex. Pen. Code 39.06(d) when it basically eliminated the meaning of ‘prohibited from disclosure’ as written in the code and replaced it with a vague ‘information that is confidential’ standard.”

05/01/2024

“A court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal by the State of an order of deferred disposition.”

04/24/2024

“Can the Court of Appeals recalculate court costs on their own without remanding the case to the trial court for an ability-to-pay inquiry?”

03/27/2024

“Did the Appeals court incorrectly interpret Martin v. State when it determined that the requirement of “continuous association” in a street gang is satisfied by the underlying crime and no additional or prior crime is required for the charge of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity?”

02/21/2024

“When two officers both testify about one joint pursuit of an individual after that individual evaded them in a motor vehicle, is there no double jeopardy violation when the individual is charged and convicted of evading from both officers simply because the individual gives a different account of the chase to a third party?”

02/07/2024

1. “Did the court of appeals err by determining that Texas Government Code § 30.00027 deprived the intermediate appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal from an adverse decision made by a county-level court reviewing a judgment from a municipal court of record?
   1. Does Chapter 30 of the Texas Government Code expressly divest the intermediate appellate courts and this Court of jurisdiction to hear appeals by the State in cases originating in a municipal court of record?
   2. Does binding precedent from this Court provide that Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the State’s ability to appeal cases originating in municipal courts of record?
   3. Does the court of appeals’s interpretation of Chapter 30 of the Texas Government Code render § 30.00026 meaningless?
   4. Does the court of appeals’s interpretation of Texas Government Code § 30.00027 add limits to an appellee’s right to appeal which do not appear in the statutory text?”

02/07/2024

ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION

1. “Whether the Ranger made a positive promise to Appellant under Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), when he said that ‘there’s no reason on this deal why you shouldn’t be adjudicated as a juvenile. And what that means is they’re going to get you help. You’re not going off to prison or anything horrible like that.’”
2. “Whether the ‘positive promise’ standard of Garcia applies to juveniles?”
3. “Whether the totality of the circumstances in this case rendered Appellant’s statement involuntary?”

01/31/2024

“Does the trial court have the discretion to make an affirmative finding of family violence during sentencing prior to adjudication?”

01/10/2024

1. “Whether the fact that a witness is a foreign national no longer in this country and without legal authority to enter this country is itself sufficient to show unavailability of the witness for purposes of the hearsay exceptions in Texas Rule of Evidence 804?”
2. “Whether statements by a prosecutor, as an officer of the court, may be considered reliable for purposes of a preliminary question concerning the admissibility of evidence?”

12/20/2023

1. “May a reviewing court rely exclusively on the ‘custodial interrogation environment’ rather than assess whether a defendant was subjected to interrogation regarding the invocation of the right to interrogation counsel and, if so, may a defendant prospectively invoke their right to interrogation counsel before being subjected to questioning?”
2. “May a reviewing court supplant the objective test reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding a defendant's statement to determine whether it unambiguously invoked the right to interrogation counsel with a subjective test based on the testimony of a witness?”

12/20/2023

1. “The 87th Legislature passed Senate Bill 1373 which amended Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42.15(a-1). The amendment requires courts to conduct ability-to-pay inquiries ‘on the record.’ The amendment became effective on September 1, 2021. The bill said the statutory changes apply to fines, fees, and costs ‘imposed before, on, or after’ the bill’s effective date. Should the new on-the-record requirement apply retroactively to Mr. Cruz’s trial which was conducted twenty days before September 1, 2021?”
2. “This question assumes the new requirement that ability-to-pay inquiries be conducted on the record is retroactive. The Texas Constitution’s retroactive laws provision prohibits only statutes which disturb vested, substantive rights. Laws altering procedure do not generally fall within the prohibition. ‘Procedure’ refers to changes in the process by which criminal cases are adjudicated as opposed to changes in the substantive law of crimes. Is the new law’s retroactivity procedural and therefore constitutional?”
3. “Mr. Cruz did not object to the absence of an on-the-record ability-to-pay inquiry. Nor did he affirmatively waive his right to such an inquiry. Whether he can complain on appeal about the absence of the inquiry depends on the categorization of his right under Marin. If his right is either a waivable right or an absolute requirement, he may complain on appeal. Is his right either a waivable right or an absolute requirement under Marin?”

12/20/2023

1. “Regarding the assessment of the state consolidated court cost, which date controls – the offense date or the date of conviction?”
2. “Regarding the assessment of the state consolidated court cost for offenses committed before January 1, 2020, which date controls – the offense date or the date of conviction?”
3. “Did the court of appeals err in determining that Section 51.608 of the Government Code is the controlling law in effect on the date the offense was committed rather than the pre-January 1, 2020, Section 133.102(a)(1) of the Local Government Code?”

12/13/2023

State represented by SPA

1. “When cumulation of sentences is ordered, should objection be required to complain on appeal about a deficiency of proof supporting it or lack of specificity in the written order?”
2. “Was the evidence in this case adequate to connect appellant to a prior sentence?”
3. “When cumulation of sentences is ordered but there is some deficiency of proof in the record, should the remedy be remand for a new cumulation hearing?”
4. “When cumulation of sentences is ordered but there is some deficiency of specificity in the written order, should the remedy be remand for clarification?”

11/22/2023

1. “The Fourteenth Court misapplied the standard of review for legal sufficiency when it held that a rational jury could not infer that the appellant wished to murder his own mother based upon her past testimony in a protective order case.”
2. “The Fourteenth Court further misapplied the standard of review for legal sufficiency when it held that a person does not have a ‘status’ as a witness when that person is expected to give testimony in a then-pending proceeding. This contradicts long-standing legal usage of the term ‘witness.’”

11/01/2023

State represented by SPA

1. “Is holding a jury trial in the county’s designated auxiliary courtroom located in the same public building as the county jail and Sheriff’s Department inherently prejudicial to the presumption of innocence?”
2. “Was the use of the auxiliary courtroom justified when the trial judge’s findings support the determination that he sought to: (1) prevent exposing jurors to Appellant in shackles and jail attire, (2) alleviate security concerns, and (3) provide adequate trial facilities?”

10/18/2023

State represented by SPA

1. "Evidence of mental disease or defect that at best bolsters a matter collateral to a defendant’s mental state defense is inadmissible under Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)."
2. "If such evidence is admissible, the court of appeals erred by assessing harm for constitutional error under Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a) because appellant presented a detailed defense."

10/11/2023

State represented by SPA

APPELLANT’S ISSUE

Did the court of appeals improperly substitute its own judgment for a jury’s that was never given the opportunity with proper instruction?

STATE’S ISSUE

The court of appeals’s harm analysis did not consider the unlikelihood that the jury would have reached the necessity issue given the implausibility of the testimony supporting it when viewed against the record as a whole.

09/27/2023

State represented by SPA

1. “Does the Confrontation Clause require a trial court to detail the legal and factual underpinnings for its finding that a necessity under Haggard v. State, 612 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020), warrants dispensing with in-person confrontation for a witness?”
2. “If so, did the defendant forfeit more detailed findings by not objecting, or should the case be abated for these?”
3. “Is fear of retaliation from the defendant’s associates and responsibility for caring for a family member the kind of state-interest necessities that permit videoconference testimony in place of in-person confrontation?”

09/06/2023

“When four judges have considered whether to properly grant a motion for new trial and two of them have decided that such a motion was properly granted, then that decision cannot be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. The two-justice majority of the Court of Appeals never explicitly found that the trial court’s decision was either arbitrary or unreasonable, and their Opinion failed to give proper deference to the trial court’s ruling. When reviewing the Court of Appeals’ decision, it is clear the State was unable to show that trial counsel’s decision to order his subordinate attorney to play the entirety of one of, if not, the most damning piece of evidence in the entire trial and admit it into evidence did not undermine confidence in the outcome.”

08/23/2023

1. “The court of appeals disregarded the plain language of Election Code § 255.004(b) (the ‘True Source of Communication’ statute) and misconstrued it to unlawfully require identification of the source of a campaign communication. On its face, the statute does not require identification of the source; it only prohibits misidentification of it.”
2. “The court of appeals erred at every step in analyzing whether Election Code § 255.004(b) was narrowly drafted, resulting in the court of appeals erroneously holding the statute unconstitutional.”

08/23/2023

ON COURT’S OWN MOTION

“Did the court of appeals err in holding that the charge did not have to include a special jury unanimity instruction requiring that the jury be unanimous as to whether appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery by threat or aggravated robbery by bodily injury?”

08/23/2023

“The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That Appellant Raised a Cognizable Claim in a Pre-Trial Habeas Corpus Proceeding.”

GRANTED ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION (1-17-24)

"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s finding that Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution on the basis of sex discrimination."

05/31/2023

“The Court of Appeals Erred to Find That the State Was Required to Provide Appellant with Specific Notice as to Which Manner and Means the State Would Seek to Prove.”

05/17/2023

1. “A divided appellate court ignored the law governing the review of suppression rulings by usurping the deference given to the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses and evidence.”
2. “A divided appellate court disagreed on a material question of law necessary to the court’s decision whether the prolonged detention rendered the seizure of evidence unlawful as fruit of the poisonous tree.”

05/17/2023

1. “By holding that before a pretrial facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is cognizable, a favorable resolution of the challenge must result in immediate release on all charges in the indictment, the Eighth Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. Ex parte Couch, PD-0422-22, pending before the Court of Criminal Appeals. PDR accepted on September 22, 2022.   This same issue is also before this Court in a pending Petition for Discretionary Review following a decision with similar reasoning by the Tenth Court of Appeals. See Ex parte Hammons, 646 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. App.—Waco, pet. filed), No. PD-0322-22 (Tex. Crim. App. July 21, 2022).”  
2. “Additionally, by requiring favorable resolution of a pretrial-habeas facial constitutional challenge to result in immediate release on all charges, the opinion below conflicts with this Court’s decisions in Ex parte Meyer, 73 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ex parte Crisp 66 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); and Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).”  
3. “The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal Constitutional Law that has not been settled in the State of Texas, whether there is a cognizable due process violation, under the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause to the Federal Constitution, because of the lack of reasonable time restriction from time of the order committing the incompetent to the State Hospital to the time in which the incompetent is actually at the hospital.”
4. “The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of State Law that has not been settled in the State of Texas—whether Art. 46B.0095 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is violative of 14th Amendment Due Process Clause because of the lack of reasonable time restriction from the time of the order committing the incompetent to the State Hospital to the actual time the incompetent is at the hospital.”

04/26/2023

“The Court of Appeals erred by declaring that the evidence developed in the hearing on Petitioner’s motion for new trial was void because the trial court had no authority to hold the hearing beyond the trial court’s 75-day plenary period, even though the trial court relied on the plain language in the 1st Emergency Order.”

04/12/2023

“Did the lower court properly adopt a restitution standard under Bailey [v. State, 171 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005)] or did this Court’s opinion in Hanna [v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)] replace any pre-Hanna restitution standards, which eliminated any conflict amongst the sister courts?”

04/05/2023

1. “The Court of Appeals’s majority erred in holding that Officer Pope had reasonable suspicion to prolong Appellant’s detention to conduct a canine sniff after the purpose of the traffic stop had concluded.”
2. “The Court of Appeals’s majority erred in viewing Appellant’s refusal to give consent to search his vehicle as an indicium of criminal activity.”

03/29/2023

“The Court of Appeals erred in analyzing the harm, bias and prejudice injected into the trial by allowing the introduction of rap videos and Facebook pages.”

03/15/2023

1. “The court of appeals employed a heightened standard for probable cause, departing from the flexible standard required by law.”
2. “The court of appeals applied inconsistent standards for probable cause in its analyses of the warrant affidavits for the searches of the appellant’s cell phone data and the location information associated with the appellant’s cellphone number.”

03/08/2023

1. “If a witness testifies at a criminal trial while wearing a surgical mask that covers the witness’s nose and mouth, is a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation denied?”
2. “Is there a general exception during a global pandemic to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and in-person confrontation?”
3. “If there is a global pandemic exception, at what point does a global pandemic begin, and at what point does a global pandemic end?”
4. “If particularized findings are necessary, were the findings in this case sufficient to dispense with face-to-face confrontation because doing so was necessary to further an important public policy, and the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured?”

03/01/2023

“Was the indictment dated July 9, 2021 for an offense alleged to have occurred on July 7, 2019, returned within the two-year limitations period set forth in 12.02(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?”

02/22/2023

“Should this Court find the Fifth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Ranger from 2010 is wrongly decided and conflicts with precedent from this Court in Dees and Safety National?”

02/15/2023

State represented by SPA

“Taking into account Texas’ unique judicial-branch and peace-officer jurisdiction, mistake of law should apply whenever an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law that a majority of this Court has not yet construed, notwithstanding negative precedent in the controlling appellate-court jurisdiction.”

01/25/2023

“Even assuming the statutory construction of ‘conceal’ was correct, the court of appeals misapplied the applicable standard of review because any ‘highly fact specific’ analysis required the court of appeals to defer to the factfinder under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.”

12/21/2022

State represented by SPA

“For attempt crimes against persons—like capital murder of police—does attempt law require ‘striking distance’ proximity and weapons display and positioning or movement toward the intended victim to constitute ‘an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense’?”

10/26/2022

“Is it reversible error to allow the State to argue that maintaining his innocence is evidence of a defendant’s guilt?”

10/26/2022

State represented by SPA

“Does sworn, unchallenged testimony on a material issue have probative value?”

10/19/2022

“The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a pretrial facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute requires the requested relief to result in immediate release on all charges.”

10/05/2022

“In the context of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of a statute, does ‘immediate release’ apply to the charge or entirety of the prosecution?”

09/28/2022

DEFENSE’S GROUNDS

1. “Can police lawfully detain someone for violating a law that is suspended by the governor under the Texas Disaster Act?”
2. “Is the governor required to issue an executive order and file it with the secretary of state in order to invoke the suspension-of-laws provision of the Texas Disaster Act?”

GRANTED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION

“Did the Texas Disaster Act, Texas Government Code §418.016(a), authorize the governor to suspend Texas Transportation Code §§502.407 & 502.473?”

09/07/2022

STATE’S GROUND

“Did the court of appeals have jurisdiction over Sinclair’s appeal?”

GRANTED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION

“In a proceeding under Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does a trial court have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to reconsider after the trial court has entered an appealable order denying or granting, in whole or part, an application under the statute?”

09/07/2022

STATE’S GROUNDS

1. “Is a fact-based claim of a past adjudication under Texas Family Code Section 54.02(j) cognizable on pretrial habeas review?”
2. “Did the overruling of Moon v. State in Ex parte Thomas retroactively vest the criminal district court with jurisdiction despite two appellate court judgments concluding that the criminal district court lacked jurisdiction to try Cameron Moon in the vacated criminal trial?”
3. “Did appellant’s request for relief on direct appeal seeking a reversal and a new certification hearing estop him from complaining on pretrial writ of habeas corpus that the criminal district court previously ‘adjudicated’ him in the trial he sought to have vacated?”

GRANTED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION

“When Section 54.02(j)(3) of the Family Code speaks of an ‘adjudication’ and an ‘adjudication hearing,’ does the meaning of those words also embrace events that might occur in an adult criminal trial, or are their meanings restricted to the context of juvenile proceedings?”

09/07/2022

“Did the court of appeals err in concluding that an employee retained an expectation of privacy in his work vehicle several days after he was arrested and after the vehicle was returned to his employer?”

08/24/2022

1. “The Fourteenth Court erred when it held that it would violate due process for the court to take judicial notice that the science behind DNA is valid.”
2. “The Fourteenth Court erred when it held that a DNA profile run in accredited laboratory is not something upon which an expert may rely in making a determination that DNA profiles match.”

08/24/2022

State represented by SPA

1. “Has the State’s statutory duty to disclose evidence ‘as soon as practicable’ been violated if the prosecutor fails to disclose an item of evidence the D.A.’s Office does not know exists but that has been in police custody for months?”
2. “If so, does the trial court have authority to impose an exclusionary sanction when there has been no bad faith or demonstrable prejudice to the opposing party and the statute provides for no such sanction?”

08/24/2022

“Does an officer have probable cause to arrest a person passed out in a moving lane of traffic, with the engine running, coupled with several signs of intoxication, for DWI, despite no one visibly seeing that person driving?”

07/27/2022

“The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in revocation proceedings because it relied on precedent predating, and/or at odds with, this Court’s jurisprudence as elucidated in Ex Parte Doan.”

07/27/2022

State represented by SPA

“The court of appeals ignored established multiple-punishments law by refusing to review a record that shows multiple potential units of prosecution on its face.”

07/27/2022

1. “Art. 36.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides no person shall be permitted to be with a jury while it is deliberating. The petit juror affidavit admitted in Becerra’s Motion for New Trial hearing established the alternate juror was present and participated in deliberations and voted on the verdict. What status, if any, does Art. 33.011(b) confer on alternate juror service permitting the presence and/or participation of the alternate during petit jury deliberations and did the alternate’s act in voting violate Art. 36.22?”
2. “Rule 606(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence prohibits evidence of “incidents that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.” The uncontroverted petit juror affidavit admitted at Becerra’s Motion for New Trial hearing attested the alternate juror voted on the verdict, and after removal and instruction no further vote was taken. Is the evidence that no further vote was taken an incident during deliberations under Rule 606(b) and, if excludable, must Rule 606(b) yield to the need to prove a violation of Art. V, Sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution and Art. 33.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure?”
3. “This Court has long held a rebuttable presumption of harm exists if a facial violation of Art. 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is shown. The Court of Appeals acknowledged Becerra’s admitted evidence that the alternate juror voted on the verdict was admissible as outside evidence under Rule 606(b)(2)(A) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Did the failure of that Court to apply the presumption based on this evidence so far deviate from accepted law so as to call for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction?” 

06/29/2022

ON COURT’S OWN MOTION

1. “Whether Appellee voluntarily waived his right to counsel.”
2. “Whether Appellee clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation.”
3. “Whether the trial court violated Art. 1.051, subsections (f-2) and (g), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”

06/22/2022

1. “When a defendant commits a new offense immediately following an illegal search or seizure, does the new offense cease to be an intervening circumstance attenuating taint unless it is violent and/or unforeseen?”
2. “Is an officer in a public place not in a ‘lawful place’ under a plain view analysis merely because a Fourth Amendment violation occurred?”

06/22/2022

1. “Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict Delarosa of Sexual Assault?
   1. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that minority is a mental defect rendering consent invalid for the purposes of Sexual Assault?
   2. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the evidence was sufficient to find that any sexual contact between Petitioner and the victim was without her consent?”
2. “Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the jury charge did not egregiously harm Petitioner when it instructed the jury on an offense that the Petitioner was not charged with?”

06/22/2022

Kinney County’s Ground for Review

“The Court of Appeals Erred by Basing its Opinion on the Holdings of the Habeas Court Without Determining Whether Such Holdings Were Correct.”

Grounds Granted on the Court’s Own Motion

1. “[W]hether the Kinney County Attorney was authorized to file a State’s appeal from the habeas proceedings in Travis County[.]”
2. “[W]hether the Kinney County Attorney was authorized to file a petition for discretionary review.”

06/08/2022

“The Fourteenth Court erred by holding that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applied to probation revocation proceedings. This holding conflicts with published holdings from four Texas courts of appeals and nine federal circuit courts, and with the federal Supreme Court’s explicit statement that revocation proceedings are not ‘criminal prosecutions.’”

04/06/2022

State represented by SPA

1. “Must a defendant be acquitted if the trial court grants a motion for new trial alleging only that ‘the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence’ and the State does not appeal?” 
2. “Was it so certain that a first jury’s ‘not true’ findings survive the granting of a new trial and collaterally estop the State from pursuing the findings on retrial that counsel was ineffective for not so arguing?”

03/30/2022

State represented by SPA

“Is a child’s statement to police inadmissible if a magistrate begins the process to determine voluntariness under Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(f) but never finishes it?”

03/16/2022

“The court of appeals erred in finding egregious harm, where the record is clear that the jury understood that a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault would be based on Appellant’s attempted penetration of the victim’s sexual organ by Appellant’s sexual organ.”

03/02/2022

1. “Did the court of appeals err in finding that Texas Penal Code Section 43.262 is a content-based regulation of protected speech that fails strict scrutiny?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err in considering Texas Penal Code Section 43.262’s constitutionality under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine?”
3. “Did the court of appeals err in its overbreadth analysis of Texas Penal Code Section 43.262?”

03/02/2022

“The Second Court of Appeals’ opinion that draws a determinative distinction under article 22.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure between the calling of a defendant’s name at a “courtroom door” as opposed to a “courthouse door” conflicts with every other Texas appellate decision rendered on the same issue, including three settled opinions from this Court. The Second Court’s decision introduces confusion and conflict into an area of law that was previously simple and undisturbed and leaves bailiffs and clerks who are tasked with ensuring compliance with article 22.02 in a state of flux. This Court should grant discretionary review.”

02/09/2022

When two indictments are consolidated for trial under Texas Penal Code § 3.02 and the first indictment is based on a statute that has been challenged via a pretrial habeas application, but the statute underlying the second indictment is not challenged, does consolidation impact the cognizability of the habeas challenge to the first indictment?

11/20/2024

1. “Once a witness learns the meaning of a phrase from other people is the meaning of that phrase thereafter part of the personal knowledge of the witness which the witness can then testify to without violating the Confrontation Clause?”
2. “Are non-hard science expert witnesses required under the Confrontation Clause to perform the same level of independent testing/analysis required of hard science expert witnesses before they can give an expert opinion based on hearsay evidence?”
3. “Did the Court of Appeals err by finding harm from the admission of Detective Reed’s testimony?”

01/26/2022

“The Fourteenth Court erred by holding that a motion to dismiss that explicitly reserved the State’s right to refile was retroactively converted into an ‘immunity agreement’ when the trial court dismissed a subsequent case on grounds of equitable immunity. Nothing in the record shows the trial court ever consented to an immunity agreement.”

01/26/2022

State represented by SPA

1. “Does defense-elicited testimony that the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse are lies and the result of manipulation and coaching justify the admission of lay, rebuttal testimony from an officer that the victim’s allegations were credible?”
2. “If the officer’s brief victim-credibility testimony was not proper rebuttal, was it harmless error because other direct credibility testimony was later admitted without objection as proper rebuttal evidence?”
3. “If the officer’s brief victim-credibility testimony was not proper rebuttal, was it harmless error under a traditional harm analysis?”

01/12/2022

1. “Whether the majority opinion fails to defer to the strong presumption that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue a sudden passion instruction fell within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance?”
2.  “Whether the majority opinion’s harm analysis improperly disregards the effect of the jury’s rejection of appellant’s theory of self-defense?”

12/08/2021

“The Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the interaction between the Appellant and Officers Sallee and Starks was at all times a consensual encounter. Although the encounter may have initially been consensual, the encounter quickly escalated into an investigative detention that was not supported by reasonable suspicion when the Appellant yielded to the officers’ show of authority before the first search.”

12/08/2021

1. “The 11th Court of Appeals erred where it decided an important question of state law, specifically what constitutes an ‘additional or different offense’ in the context of Texas Penal Code section 22.011(a)(2), based on erroneous statutory interpretation that conflicts with decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”
2. “The 11th Court of Appeals erred where it applied an incomplete, and therefore wrong standard to dispose of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”

12/08/2021

State represented by SPA

1. “Is the fact of a witness’s inconsistency coupled with the jury’s prerogative to disbelieve part of his testimony affirmative evidence that supports submission of a lesser-included offense?”
2. “While evidence can be ‘weak, impeached, or contradicted’ and still raise a lesser-included offense, shouldn’t inferences be required to be supported by facts before they can?”

11/24/2021

State represented by SPA

1. “Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hold a trial while the State’s petition for discretionary review was pending in this Court?”
2. “Are speedy trial claims cognizable on pretrial habeas if the applicant asks for a speedy trial rather than dismissal?”
3. “Did the court of appeals improperly reverse the trial court’s ruling for what the trial court said instead of what it did?”

11/10/2021

“Whether the Fourteenth Court of Appeals improperly acted as a ‘thirteenth juror’ by re-evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence showing that the complainant’s gunshot wounds constituted serious bodily injury?”

10/27/2021

“Did the Fourth Court of Appeals misapply the Brooks/Jackson standard for determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence by improperly reweighing the evidence and reassigning veracity in an erroneous attempt to follow the U.S. v. Dost factors?”

10/27/2021

“[T]he decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction holding to John[son] v. State 72, S.W.3d 346, 347(Tex.Crim.App.) is in conflict with other Court rulings [and] based on the circumstances of Rios’s case the Court of Appeals should have held to State EX Rel Curry v. Carr, [847 S.W.2d] 561, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) and reversed Rios’ conviction and ordered that he be given a trial by jury as he asked for.”

10/27/2021

“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that evidence of a high level of cocaine in a child’s body alone is sufficient to prove that the child suffered ‘serious mental deficiency, impairment or injury,’ as required for conviction of injury to a child.”

10/06/2021

In concluding that Appellant’s convictions for injury to a child causing serious bodily injury and injury to a child causing serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury violated double jeopardy, did the court of appeals erroneously focus on the transaction rather than the result?

09/29/2021

1. “Is the statutory right to withdraw a waiver of counsel under article 1.051(h) absolute or subject to restrictions?”
2. “What admonishments does Faretta (or article 1.051) require for a defendant who initially contests guilt but later pleads guilty?”
3. “Did the court below correctly conclude that no Faretta admonishments were required where Appellant initially contested his guilt?”

09/16/2021

“Did the jury charge in a case that involved autoerotic asphyxiation that led to the death of one of the participants and a conviction of murder for the other participant, and contained an incorrect definition of ‘intentionally,’ which allowed the jury to find the Appellant guilty merely by finding that he intended the action, rather than intending the result, cause harm.”

09/15/2021

“Whether the search warrant was facially valid because it incorporated the warrant affidavit, which specifically listed Appellant’s room as containing narcotics.”

09/15/2021

“Are all anticipatory search warrants are prohibited under Texas law?”

09/15/2021

State represented by SPA

“Is a trial court presiding over a retrospective competency hearing required to force counsel on an unwilling defendant who is presumed to be competent?”

09/15/2021

“Whether The Court Of Appeals Tenth District Erred In Holding The Evidence Legally Sufficient To Support Petitioner’s Conviction For The Offense Of Theft Of Cargo?”

09/15/2021

State represented by SPA

1. “Does the concept of concurrent causation, Tex. Penal Code § 6.04(a), apply to the results caused by third parties for which the defendant is criminally responsible?”
2. “Is ambivalence over the amount of serious bodily injury directly attributable to the defendant evidence that her conduct was clearly insufficient to cause any serious bodily injury?”

06/30/2021

“The Court of Appeals erred by applying the incorrect prejudice standard to determine that the Appellant cannot meet his burden to show the outcome of his trial would have been different had he been correctly advised that only the jury could consider placing him on probation.”

06/30/2021

“Contrary to this Court’s prior decision in this case, the court of appeals expressly defied the ordinarily applicable rules for examining a waiver of a defendant’s rights under Miranda and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by applying the ‘cat out of the bag’ coercion theory to Castanedanieto’s claim that his second police interrogation waiver was unknowing.”

06/26/2021

1. “Does collateral estoppel bar the State from prosecuting a defendant for conduct occurring at a different time and place than the original conduct for which the defendant was acquitted?”
2. “Does collateral estoppel mean that a defendant’s mental state cannot change due to intervening circumstances between the original conduct for which he was acquitted and the subsequent conduct for which he remains charged?”
3. “Does collateral estoppel mean that a defendant whose ongoing conduct may constitute multiple criminal offenses can only be prosecuted for a single offense despite the conduct occurring in different places, at different times and with intervening circumstances between the originally-prosecuted conduct and the potentially-prosecutable latter conduct?”
4. “Does the Court of Appeals’ expansive view of collateral estoppel implicitly resuscitate the long-abandoned carving doctrine limiting prosecution to a single offense when justice and reason demand prosecution for each potential criminal misconduct?”

06/09/2021

1. “By holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish David’s identity as the individual who committed the offense when he was alone in a locked bathroom with the tampered-with evidence, the Court of Appeals erred by ignoring the circumstantial evidence establishing David’s identity and requiring the State to disprove an alternative hypothesis regarding the offender’s identity.”
2. “By holding that placing marijuana in a toilet bowl containing feces does not constitute ‘altering’ or ‘destroying’ within the meaning of the tampering-with-physical-evidence offense, the Court of Appeals failed to apply the appropriate legal-sufficiency standard by improperly substituting its judgment for that of the jury’s and disregarding the jury’s common-sense inference that marijuana that has been contaminated with feces has been altered or destroyed.”
3. “Even if the Court of Appeals did not err by holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support David’s conviction for tampering with physical evidence, the Court of Appeals erred by failing to reform the conviction to the lesser-included offense of attempted tampering with physical evidence, thereby violating this Court’s instruction in Thornton v. State.”

06/07/2021

“The appellate court erred by denying relief from the trial court’s abuse of discretion in not setting a personal bond or reducing Lanclos’s bond to an amount affordable to him, which the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly requires as relief.”

05/19/2021

State represented by SPA

“If a defendant has to accept the benefit of a negotiated plea agreement via videoconferencing, has he lost a substantive right or been harmed?”

05/19/2021

State represented by SPA

“If a defendant has to accept the benefit of a negotiated plea agreement via videoconferencing, has he lost a substantive right or been harmed?”

04/28/2021

State represented by SPA

1. “If the error at trial was in admitting evidence under a nonconstitutional rule—Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23— shouldn’t harm be assessed under the non-constitutional harm standard in Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b)?”
2. “If the non-constitutional “substantial rights” standard applies, was the error harmless?”

04/21/2021

State represented by SPA

“Does TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.07’s grant of ‘original jurisdiction of all misdemeanors’ give county courts jurisdiction—concurrent with district courts—over official misconduct cases?”

04/21/2021

“The Fourteenth Court of Appeals misconstrued Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and erred in concluding that the State does not have the right to appeal the trial court’s order granting relief in a habeas corpus proceeding brought under Article 11.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when the trial court’s order functionally served to either grant a new trial or to dismiss the information—both of which would constitute an appealable order under Article 44.01(a).”

04/21/2021

State represented by SPA

1. “Is an objection required to preserve a challenge to restitution ordered payable to the Attorney General for a crime-victim-fund payment made on behalf of a sexual assault victim for a forensic medical exam?”
2. “Alternatively, does a restitution order payable to the Attorney General for a crime-victim-fund payment made on behalf of a sexual assault victim for a forensic medical exam qualify as victim compensation?”
3. “Alternatively, is a restitution order payable to the Attorney General for a crime-victim-fund payment made on behalf of a sexual assault victim for a forensic medical exam a proper reimbursement cost?”

04/21/2021

1. “The First Court erred by holding that a shotgun objection and a complaint about another part of the statute preserved the appellant’s appellate argument. This conflicts with this Court’s holding in Resendez [v. State, 307 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)].”
2. “The First Court erred by holding that the State had to admit DNA test results at a pretrial habeas hearing challenging the validity of the charging instrument.”
3. “This limitations claim is not cognizable on pretrial habeas because it requires going beyond the face of the charging instrument.”

04/14/2021

State represented by SPA

“If a case at the petition-to-adjudicate stage and a defendant’s subsequent similar crime at the guilt phase are heard simultaneously, are they ‘prosecuted in a single criminal action’ such that any imposed sentences must run concurrently?”

03/31/2021

1. “The Illegal Voting statute requires that ‘the person knows the person is not eligible to vote.’ Tex. Elec. Code §64.012(a)(1). This Court’s precedent, notably Delay v. State, 465 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), confirms that the State must prove that the person knew her conduct violated the Election Code. Did the court of appeals err in holding that ‘the fact that [Ms. Mason] did not know she was legally ineligible to vote was irrelevant to her prosecution’?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err by adopting an interpretation of the Illegal Voting statute that is preempted by the federal Help America Vote Act—specifically by interpreting the Illegal Voting statute to criminalize the good faith submission of provisional ballots where individuals turn out to be incorrect about their eligibility to vote?”
3. “In an issue of first impression, did the court of appeals misinterpret the Illegal Voting statute by holding that submitting a provisional ballot that is rejected constitutes ‘vot[ing] in an election’?”

03/31/2021

“The Beaumont Court of Appeals erred in finding the evidence legally sufficient to prove Petitioner had a qualifying prior conviction for purposes of Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A).

Consequently,

1. Petitioner was entitled to a directed verdict; and
2. Petitioner’s objections to the § 22.01(b)(2)(A) jury charge were erroneously denied.”

03/31/2021

1. “The court of appeals departed from the proper standard of review by substituting its own judgment for that of the magistrate who viewed the warrant affidavit and found probable cause.”
2. “The court of appeals employed a heightened standard for probable cause, departing from the flexible standard required by law.”

03/31/2021

1. “Are mandatory life-without-parole sentences cruel and unusual as applied to intellectually disabled offenders?”
2. “If the opinion below is affirmed, what are the available punishment options?”

03/18/2021

“The Court of Appeals for the First District erred when it found, contrary to five other courts of appeals, that a trial court maintains unending jurisdiction over community supervision cases to grant ‘judicial clemency.’”

03/10/2021

State represented by SPA

“The court of appeals ignored important evidence and substituted its interpretation of the victim’s testimony for the jury’s.”

03/10/2021

“After holding that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s rejection of the defendant’s due-diligence affirmative defense, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to further address the issue of estoppel, even though the State raised the estoppel issue in the trial court, the trial court relied on the estoppel issue in proceeding to adjudicate the defendant’s guilt, and the State again raised the estoppel issue in the Court of Appeals.”

02/24/2021

“From the appellate court’s statutory construction of Section 32.21(e-1) of the Texas Penal Code, there was no jury-charge error; but more importantly, this Court should resolve a jurisdictional conflict that now exists in Texas law as to how county and district attorneys in the State of Texas should correctly charge and prosecute criminal offenses for forgery of financial instruments- specifically, checks which, as writings, serve a historic role in the forgery statute in Texas jurisprudence and the economies of Texas and the United States of America.”

02/24/2021

1. “The Court of Appeals erred by finding the value ladder provisions of the forgery statute to be mandatory in all cases where forgery was committed in order to obtain property or services.”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the State was required to allege the purpose for which Appellee intended to commit the forgery offense if the State was prosecuting Appellee for a forgery offense under a provision other than Section 32.21(e-1).”

02/23/2021

1. “The Fourteenth Court erred by holding a trial court cannot grant a jury’s request for a transcript of disputed testimony.”
2. “The Fourteenth Court erred by conducting a harm analysis that did not consider the strength of the State’s evidence, the weakness of the defense, or the fact that the supposed error did not bear on a legally determinative issue.”

02/10/2021

1. “Whether, if the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute this case under § 273.021, the statute’s grant of prosecutorial authority violates the separation of powers requirement in the Texas Constitution.”
2. “Whether the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute ‘election law’ cases outside of the Election Code, and if so, whether Penal Code § 37.10 is an ‘election law’ within the meaning of Election Code § 273.021.”
3. “Whether campaign finance reports are ‘election records’ within the meaning of Penal Code § 37.10.”

02/03/2021

1. “Whether prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted to prove knowledge of contraband and intent to possess contraband under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”
2. “Whether prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence to rebut the defensive theory that the defendant lacked knowledge of the presence of contraband.”
3. “Whether prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence to prove the identity of the person who possessed the contraband.”
4. “Whether prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under the doctrine of chances.”

02/03/2021

“Did the First Court of Appeals err by acting as factfinder in appellant’s 11.072 habeas proceeding? Unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals in an Article 11.07 writ, the 1st Court of Appeals’ role in an Article 11.072 writ is purely that of an appellate court. Consequently, the question before the appellate court was not whether to accept or reject the trial court’s findings, but whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.”

02/03/2021

1. “State’s Exhibit 177 was Admissible Under Article 37.07, § 3(a)(1) Because it was ‘Relevant to Sentencing’ and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals Erred in not Being Guided by the Language of the Statute.”
2. “If State’s Exhibit 177 was Admitted in Error, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals Erred in Finding Appellant was Harmed When it Only Added Evidence that His 2002 Domestic Violence Conviction Involved Him Kicking and Biting His Wife.”

02/03/2021

1. “The court of appeals erred in holding the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting into evidence two of appellant’s prior cocaine convictions in order to prove appellant’s knowledge and/or intent with regard to the cocaine recovered in the charged offense, even after a defense witness claimed appellant had no knowledge or intent to commit the charged offense.”
2. “The court of appeals erred in holding that, upon introducing a defendant’s prior narcotics convictions into evidence in order to prove a defendant’s knowledge and/or intent in his current narcotics prosecution, the State must also show the facts or details of the prior narcotics cases in order to show their similarity to the charged offense.”
3. “The court of appeals erred in holding appellant’s substantial rights were adversely affected, for the purposes of TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b), merely because the purported error occurred—and nothing more.”

02/03/2021

“Can harmlessness be presumed from a silent record when a defendant has been denied his constitutional and statutory rights to be present during a pretrial proceeding?”

01/27/2021

“The Court of Appeals Erred to Find that the Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain the Convictions Entered in the Instant Case”

01/27/2021

State represented by SPA

“Does unlawful carrying a weapon by a gang member, Tex. Penal Code § 46.02(a-1)(2)(C), require proof the defendant was continuously or regularly committing gang crimes?”

01/27/2021

1. “Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that Appellant failed to preserve error?”
2. “Did the trial court violate Art. 36.22?”
3. “Is harm presumed when a trial court violates the first sentence of Art. 36.22?”
4. “Was Appellant harmed by the violation of the first sentence of Art. 36.22?”

01/14/2021

“When the prosecuting authority is in possession of an immunized statement, does the State bear the burden to demonstrate that the statement was not “used” in any way by the prosecution?”

01/13/2021

1. “If the testimony from an alleged accomplice witness-in-fact is completely removed from consideration, where the jury charge contained two accomplice witness instructions—one clearly correct regarding the accomplice as a matter of law—and there was substantial non-accomplice evidence to corroborate either accomplice witness’s testimony, did Appellant suffer egregious harm from any alleged error in the accomplice-in-fact instruction?”
2. “Did Appellant invite—or is he otherwise estopped from challenging—the allegedly erroneous instruction he requested and now complains of on appeal?”
3. “Was Appellant even entitled to an instruction on whether Hogarth was an accomplice as a matter of fact?”
4. “In a case where the Defense argues a witness was an accomplice, who bears the burden to prove a witness’s status as an accomplice as a matter of fact, and what is the appropriate burden?”

01/13/2021

1. “The Fourteen Court of Appeals misapplied Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 by disregarding evidence connecting Appellant to Cassie’s murder and, thus, erroneously concluding that the extraneous-offense evidence of Cassie’s murder was irrelevant.”
2. “The Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred by failing to consider whether the extraneous-offense evidence of Cassie’s murder was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) for the non-character-conformity purposes of: demonstrating that Appellant restrained Cassie without her consent; showing Appellant’s intent to use deadly force against Cassie to prevent her liberation; and providing same-transaction contextual evidence.”
3. “The Fourteenth Court of Appeals failed to conduct a meaningful assessment of whether, per Texas Rule of Evidence 403, the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence of Cassie’s murder was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

01/13/2021

“Must the State offer proof of the parameters of a licensed premises to secure a conviction for unlawful carrying of a weapon on a licensed premises?”

01/13/2021

State represented by SPA

“Should concurrent fines be discharged concurrently like concurrent terms of confinement?”

12/16/2020

State represented by SPA

1. Is indecency by touching the victim’s sexual organ a lesser-included offense of penetrating the child’s mouth with the defendant’s sexual organ if the former is the defendant’s version of the incident?
2. For indecency by contact to be a lesser of aggravated sexual assault, must the act on which the indecency is predicated have the potential to be factually subsumed within the aggravated sexual assault?

12/09/2020

“Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions for two assault[s] on a Public Servant[.]”

11/25/2020

1. “The court of appeals erred by ruling the instant record insufficient, as a matter of law, to permit a rational finding that appellant reasonably believed that deadly force was immediately necessary to defend herself or Erica Rollins against a violent home intruder on April 2, 2015.”
2. “The court of appeals erred by ruling the instant record insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the ‘confession and avoidance’ doctrine because: (1) appellant never ‘flatly denied’ any essential element of the offense charged; and (2) the record contains more than ample evidence from which the jury could find that appellant either did fire, or otherwise cause, the shot that injured the complainant here.”
3. “The intermediate appellate court effectively substituted its own harm analysis for findings of fact by a properly instructed jury.”

11/25/2020

State represented by SPA

1. “Do exigent circumstances to seize a cellular phone for fear of unintentional loss of evidence require that law enforcement act at the earliest possible opportunity?”
2. “Do exigent circumstances to seize a cellular phone for fear of intentional destruction of evidence require ‘affirmative conduct’ by the suspect?”
3. “Does the exigent circumstances exception require proof that the evidence was unavailable from other sources?”

11/18/2020

“The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s admission of a disc of inmate telephone calls over Appellant’s objection that the State’s witness was not the custodian of records.”

11/11/2020

“When the State includes a deadly-weapon allegation in its aggravated assault by threat indictment and then fails to prove its manner and means of the threat, can the State still prove assault by threat based on use or exhibition of the deadly weapon?”

11/04/2020

1. “The Fort Worth Court’s strict interpretation of the ‘confession and avoidance’ doctrine ignored the context of Appellant’s actions and admissions, and further undermined established precedent from this Court.”
2. “This Court should reaffirm the continued vitality of Martinez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).”
3. “When analyzing confession and avoidance, a court should view the admissions and the actions of the defendant within the context of the entire episode and not focus myopically on the moment of the defendant’s final criminal act.”

10/28/2020

“Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that aggravated state-jail felonies [Tex. Penal Code, Section 12.35(c)] are subject to further enhancement under the repeat and habitual-offender statute governing first, second, or third degree felonies [Tex. Penal Code 12.42(d)], rather than Section 12.425, Penalties for Repeat and Habitual Felony Offenders on Trial for State Jail Felony.”

10/21/2020

State represented by SPA

“Did the Legislature intend punishments for both continuous sexual abuse, Tex. Penal Code § 21.02, and prohibited sexual conduct, Tex. Penal Code § 25.02, against the same child?”

10/21/2020

1. “Does a single clarifying question by a police officer in response to a defendant’s spontaneous, voluntary statement constitute custodial interrogation for the purposes of Miranda?”
2. “Even if the answer to the officer’s question was inadmissible, the court of appeals erred in factoring admissible evidence, including the defendant’s initial volunteered statement and the fruit of the unMirandized statement, into its harm analysis.”

10/21/2020

1. “Did the court of appeals ignore this Court’s confession and avoidance precedent set out in Juarez v. State?”
2. “Does a Defendant need to know what ‘operating’ a vehicle means in order to satisfactorily admit to ‘operating’ a vehicle?”

10/21/2020

“Did the court of appeals fail to apply the standard of review correctly in its analysis of appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim?”

10/21/2020

“Does intentionally misdescribing an untested confidential informant as an ‘anonymous source’ in a probable cause affidavit cause the informant’s uncorroborated incriminating information to be excised pursuant to Franks?”

09/30/2020

1. “Did the Court of Appeals err when it conducted a purely de novo review of the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an alleged Brady violation, a ruling which is traditionally reviewed for an abuse of discretion?”
2. “In concluding that the non-disclosed evidence in this case was material because it ‘might have tipped the balance and resulted in an acquittal,’ did the Court of Appeals erroneously diverge from the proper materiality standard, specifically that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different?”
3. “In light of the entire body of evidence, did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that Appellant’s ability to impeach a witness regarding a distant extraneous offense with her own handwritten statement in reasonable probability would have resulted in a different outcome at trial, when that witness was actually impeached on the same issue in a different manner?”

09/30/2020

1. “The Fourteenth Court erred by applying the constitutional harm standard to unobjected-to charge error.”
2. “Alternatively, the Fourteenth Court erred by concluding that a punishment-phase objection preserved error in the guilt-phase charge.”
3. “The Fourteenth Court erred by finding reversible harm even though the error concerned an uncontested matter established by objective facts.”

09/30/2020

1. “Under the Drug Free Zone statute, is an area with play equipment presumed to be ‘open to the public’ freeing the State from having to produce legally sufficient evidence at trial?”
2. “Did the 13th Court of Appeals err by improperly analyzing the record for legally sufficient evidence proving that the ‘playground’ was “open to the public” under the Drug Free Zone statute?”
3. “Did the 13th Court of Appeals err in finding that the area where it was alleged that Petitioner possessed drugs was a ‘playground’ as defined by the Drug Free Zone statute?”

09/23/2020

1. “The judge, on an at best, partially developed record, required one spectator to view one witness’s testimony contemporaneously from a neighboring room. Is this the sort of closure requiring reversal contemplated by the right to a public trial[?]”
2. “Did the Fourth Court of Appeals fail to adequately address petitioner’s argument that the courtroom was not closed as required by Rule 47.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure[?]”
3. “Does the Fourth Court of Appeals’s opinion fail to provide proper guidance and risk creating confusion for other courts when it failed to make a clear distinction between full and partial courtroom closures and the standards applicable to each type of closure[?]”

09/16/2020

1. “This Court should review this case because the court of appeals refused to remand this case to the trial court to remedy its error as required by this Court’s holding in LaPointe v. State.”
2. “Assuming that the error in this case should have been reviewed pursuant to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the error clearly was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

09/16/2020

1. “Whether an attorney provides ineffective assistance when he admits in an affidavit that he failed to interview any potential mitigation witnesses, he made conclusory assumptions about what those witnesses might know about appellant’s life, and his decision not to interview any potential witnesses was not based on trial strategy. (C.R. at 329-32, 334-59).”
2. “Whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate even a single avenue of mitigation means that appellant was constructively denied any defense at all in the penalty phase of his trial and therefore prejudice is presumed. (C.R. at 329-32, 334-59).”
3. “Whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that because appellant used deadly force, rather than the threat of deadly force, he was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense pursuant to Tex. Pen. Code § 9.04. (VI R.R. at 171- 74; XII R.R. at 240).”

09/16/2020

State represented by SPA

1. Is the use of overhead emergency lights, combined with factors present in most if not all encounters, sufficient to seize the occupants of a parked vehicle?
2. If appellant was seized, was it reasonable?

09/16/2020

“The First Court erred by holding that a trial court cannot find a bond ‘insufficient in amount’ once a defendant has posted the bond. Whether the bond is ‘insufficient in amount’ is not a question of whether the defendant made a bond equal to the bail amount, it is a question of whether the required amount should be set higher.”

09/16/2020

“The court of appeals misapplied the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence and in a manner that so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

09/16/2020

State represented by SPA

“When the State alleges, but fails to prove, the codeine mixture the defendant possessed contains a sufficient proportion of another medicine to be medicinal, should he be acquitted?”

09/16/2020

1. “Whether the 10-day grace period for filing a notice of appeal was unavailable when the incarcerated defendant omitted the words ‘district clerk’ from the envelope he used to send his notice of appeal. [CR: 64, 74-76; APX-A/Op. Ct. App. 2-3].”
2. “Under what circumstances should an incarcerated defendant be allowed factual development to show the clerk physically received his notice of appeal within the 10-day grace period? [CR: 64, 74-76; Ltr. Br. App. 3; APX-A/Op. Ct. App. 4 n.1].”

08/19/2020

1. “When—as the Ransier Dissent recognizes—the record does not support a rational conclusion that if Appellant was guilty of anything, it was only attempted tampering, should the Fourteenth Court have nevertheless reversed Appellant’s conviction because of the failure to include a ‘lesser-included offense’ instruction to which he was not entitled?
   1. Where multiple provisions on criminal responsibility (Tex. Penal Code § 7.01 and § 7.02) and causation (Tex. Penal Code § 6.04) along with case law from this Court and other courts developing said provisions demonstrate Appellant’s criminal responsibility for causing the syringe to break—consequently preventing Appellant from showing he was ‘guilty only’ of an attempt—should the Ransier majority have disregarded the foregoing and crafted new rules regarding causation and criminal responsibility?
   2. Should the Ransier Majority have adopted Appellant’s timeline of events—essentially, considering only whether Appellant concealed the syringe from the point the Trooper first recognized it, and ignoring Appellant’s concealment prior to that point?
   3. Should the Ransier Majority have misinterpreted this Court’s opinion in Stadt and crafted its own new ‘guilty only’ rule that is directly contrary to this Court’s latter holdings, that of other courts of appeal, and to the rationale underlying the original ‘guilty only’ rule?
   4. Where this Court in Bullock carefully considered sufficiency cases’ construction of a statute during Bullock’s lesser-included analysis, should the Ransier Majority have completely disregarded such cases, instead leaving that question of law to the jury’s resolution on a case-by-case basis?”

08/19/2020

“The Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State to introduce extensive details about an extraneous offense during the guilt-innocence phase when Perkins was willing to stipulate to it.”

08/19/2020

1. “Did the Court of Appeals’ legal sufficiency of the evidence analysis comport with Jackson v. Virginia’s additional requirement that a reviewing court must determine ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’, especially when the panel mischaracterized crucial evidence, failed to fairly and critically assess what the record evidence showed, and ultimately supplied ‘a bridge to the analytical gap’ in the prosecution’s case, by theorizing or guessing about the meaning of evidence and reaching conclusions based on speculation, conjecture, and inferences unsupported by the record evidence?”
2. “Consistent with Due Process, in an appellate review of the legal sufficiency of evidence, can a jury’s assumed disbelief of certain witness testimony establish substantive proof to the contrary of that testimony?”
3. “Did the Court of Appeals fail to apply part of the legal sufficiency standard which, according to Brooks v. State, ‘essentially incorporates a factual sufficiency review into’ a review for legal sufficiency?”
4. “Did the Court of Appeals in its review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence fail to consider all of the trial evidence as required by Jackson v. Virginia, as opposed to just the evidence tending to support the verdict, although not establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?”

07/01/2020

1. “Does the corpus delicti rule require evidence totally independent of a defendant’s extrajudicial confession showing that the ‘essential nature’ of the charged crime was committed by someone?”
2. “Can independent evidence as to time, motive, opportunity, state of mind of the defendant, and/or contextual background information satisfy the corpus delicti rule in an indecency with child charge when there is zero evidence of sexual contact?”
3. “Is the evidence legally sufficient to support convictions for indecency with a child when the independent evidence does not tend to establish sexual contact?”
4. “Did the Ninth Court of Appeals improperly circumvent The Court of Criminal Appeals 2015 ruling on corpus delicti doctrine in Miller v. State, 457 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) which expressly declined to use a trustworthiness standard regarding the legal sufficiency of confessions?”

07/01/2020

“Did the Court of Appeals resolve a procedural issue relating to the timely filing and hearing of an amended motion for new trial in a manner that conflicts with Courts of Appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals precedent?”

06/24/2020

“In finding that the original indictment that charged three counts of possession or attempted possession of a controlled substance, to wit: tramadol (by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge, on or about three separate dates), alleged the same conduct, act or transaction as a subsequent indictment that charged the possession or attempted possession of oxycodone, the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, Tex. R. App, P. 66.3(a)(c).”

06/24/2020

“The court of appeals erred where it held the evidence to be sufficient to prove the use of a deadly weapon where the alleged weapon was not used in a way that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”

06/17/2020

“Whether the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that Appellant’s statement to Detective Hill was not obtained via a custodial interrogation without the benefit of any warnings when the statement was made after Appellant was ordered to involuntarily leave a residence by an overwhelming police presence and placed into the back of a police car?”

06/17/2020

"The court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly limited the appellant’s ability to consult with trial counsel during an overnight recess in violation of the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel."

06/17/2020

1. “Did the court of appeals err when it held as a matter of law that selling sexual contact with a four-year-old child could never constitute compelled prostitution?”
2. “Must a child knowingly engage in an act of prostitution for the person who sold sex with her to be guilty of compelling prostitution?”

06/17/2020

“Can written responses in a juror questionnaire, standing alone, establish a challenge for cause when based upon an inaccurately worded statutory ground for cause?”

05/06/2020

“The lower court misapplied the standard of review in this case. Specifically, the panel in this case assumed the role of fact-finder rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

05/06/2020

“Whether the majority opinion conflicts with Burch v. State, when the majority opinion affirmed the trial court’s admission of DNA testimony over Appellant’s Confrontation Clause objection?”

05/06/2020

"The Eighth Court of Appeals erred in its preliminary holding that Appellant was entitled to jury instructions on the use of deadly force in self-defense because there was no evidence presented from any source of Appellant’s subjective state of mind at the time of the shooting, that is, whether he was in immediate apprehension or fear that the deceased was about to kill or seriously injure him at the time he shot the deceased, such that Appellant was not entitled to any self-defense instructions.  Therefore, any errors in the self-defense instructions actually submitted did not result in egregious harm because Appellant was not entitled to the instructions in the first place."

05/06/2020

1. “The court of appeals misapplied the egregious harm standard of review for unobjected-to jury charge error under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), in a manner that so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”
2. “The court of appeals’ misapplication of the cumulative error doctrine in its analysis of unobjected-to jury charge error so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

04/01/2020

“Whether conclusory lay testimony can contradict undisputed testimony from medical sources and a victim on the issue of serious bodily injury such that a lesser-included offense is a ‘valid, rational alternative’ to the charged offense?”

04/01/2020

“Whether the Court of Appeals properly protected appellant’s right to an instruction on a lesser included offense by failing to consider his testimony regarding an intervening circumstance that caused the accident resulting in death?”

04/01/2020

“In affirming Petitioner’s conviction, the Eighth Court erred when it misapplied the four-factor test in Brown v. Illinois, conceding that the arrest was unlawful under Texas law but not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, was not flagrant.”

04/01/2020

1. “Article 46B.0095 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows for commitment of an incompetent defendant for the ‘maximum term provided by law for the offense for which the defendant was to be tried.’ The maximum term of confinement for a juvenile adjudicated for a first-degree felony offense is forty years if the State obtains grand jury approval for a determinate-sentence. What, then, is ‘the maximum term provided by law’ for determining the length of mental-health commitment for a juvenile who is accused of a crime severe enough to be determinate-sentence eligible but is found unfit to proceed before a grand jury could make a determinate-sentence finding?”
2. “Should the Second Court of Appeals have considered the State’s defense that it was prohibited from pursuing a determinate-sentence finding from the grand jury because the juvenile was found unfit to proceed and the judicial proceedings were stayed as a matter of law?”

03/25/2020

State represented by SPA

“Is a summary reversal warranted when the lower court violated an absolute requirement by applying law not applicable to the case, i.e. the punishment-phase sudden passion issue, not in effect until 1994, to a first-degree murder committed in 1991?”

03/11/2020

State represented by SPA

“Is reformation unauthorized unless the State pled all the elements and statutorily required notice allegations of the lesser-included offense?”

03/11/2020

State represented by SPA

“What is the unit of prosecution for failure to appear, Tex. Penal Code § 38.10?”

03/11/2020

State represented by SPA

1. “Does a trial court’s sua sponte submission of an issue in the jury charge prevent a court of appeals from considering whether the evidence raised such an issue?”
2. “If, under a defensive view of the evidence, the defendant in a murder case drew, pointed, and wrestled over the gun of his own volition, is he nonetheless entitled to a voluntary-act instruction if testimony shows that another person’s conduct precipitated the gun’s discharge?”
3. “Alternatively, should a voluntary-act instruction resemble the instruction in Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979), and specify the facts that would render the defendant’s conduct involuntary or inform the jury that voluntariness is distinct from the culpable mental state?”
4. “Alternatively, does an instruction result in some harm to the defense if it lacks this specificity and is missing from lesser-included-offense instructions never reached by the jury?”

03/11/2020

State represented by SPA

“Can error in a sexual-assault charge—which fails to specify that the defendant used his penis—be harmful when there was no evidence or claim that he used anything else?”

03/11/2020

1. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held appellant’s actions invoked the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in violation of the sixth amendment’s right to confront one’s accuser: is not knowing the location of a witness wrongdoing – especially if the State was able to serve the witness with a subpoena after said action?”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held the witness was unavailable to testify even though she had been served with a subpoena and the State of Texas made no further effort to secure her appearance.”

03/11/2020

State represented by SPA

1. “Should error in the punishment enhancement charge be reviewed as charge error rather than as an ‘illegal sentence’?”
2. “What standard of harm applies to charge errors that authorize a greater punishment?”

02/26/2020

“Is the Fifth Court of Appeals right, or are the First and Second Courts of Appeals right? Should murder always be anticipated as a apotential result of robbery?”

02/12/2020

1. “Under the Calloway [v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)] rule, is police coercion of a confession a ‘theory of law applicable to the case’ where the appellee argues that he lacked a ‘full understanding’ of his Miranda rights in a different statement?”
2. “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the reviewing court must give deference to the trial court’s resolution of the facts and review de novo the legal significance of those facts. May the court of appeals infer that a confession is involuntary as a matter of fact instead of applying the relevant legal test to the facts supported by the record?”
3. “In deferring to the trial court’s implied resolution of the facts, must the court of appeals ignore indisputable video evidence that the defendant affirmatively waived his Miranda rights?”

02/05/2020

“The Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court acted within its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce three animations to the jury which depicted the decedent Delorme as unarmed and stationary, contrary to the evidence.”

01/29/2020

1. "Was the trial judge required to believe the affidavits of defense attorneys when the State did not object to their admission, or did she have discretion to disregard their contents?"
2. "Does a police siren heard in the distance constitute a basis for which the trial court had no discretion but to grant a new trial as 'other evidence' received during deliberations?"

01/29/2020

1. “Whether statements made by police detectives during their interrogation of the Appellant constituted a threat to arrest and charge his wife with capital murder if, and only if, he did not confess to it himself.”
2. “Whether police detectives had probable cause to arrest Appellant’s wife for capital murder.”
3. “Whether the existence of probable cause to arrest Appellant’s wife for capital murder, if it existed, was sufficient to excuse threats to arrest and charge her with capital murder if Appellant did not confess to it himself.”
4. “Whether truthful statements made to Appellant by police detectives during their interrogation of him were sufficient to excuse threats to arrest and charge his wife with capital murder if he did not confess to it himself.”
5. “Whether Appellant’s involuntary confession to police detectives was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

01/15/2020

“Collateral estoppel applies only when two issues are identical. In appellant’s manslaughter trial, the jury was charged to consider whether appellant ‘recklessly caused the death’ of the complainant. In a pending aggravated assault trial, the jury will be charged to consider whether he ‘recklessly caused bodily injury’ to a different complainant. The court of appeals held that collateral estoppel applies. Was the court right?” 

01/15/2020

State represented by SPA

1. “Should an improper and prematurely assessed nonobligatory ‘Time Payment Fee’ that penalizes the failure to timely pay a court-cost, fee, or restitution be struck?”
2. “In striking down court-costs and fees, does the judiciary violate separation of powers by infringing on the Legislature’s power to enact costs, fees, and the state’s budget and the Governor’s budget power?”
3. “Is the “Time Payment Fee” proper because it imposes a time-frame for court-cost and fee payment and disincentivizes late payment and the failure to pay?”

01/15/2020

“In an issue of first impression, did the court of appeals correctly hold that a blood search warrant does not need to authorize both the drawing of blood and the testing of blood despite the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the drawing of blood and testing of blood by the government are each discrete searches implicating a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights?

12/18/2019

1. “Whether the plain language of the evading-arrest statute requires proof of knowledge that the attempted arrest or detention is lawful.”
2. “Whether it matters in this case; whether the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Nicholson knew he was being lawfully detained.”

12/11/2019

State represented by SPA

1. “Does TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1) have an exigency requirement for warrantless arrests?”
2. “If Article 14.03(a)(1) has an exigency requirement for a warrantless arrest in public, it was satisfied here because the integrity of blood-alcohol- content evidence would have been compromised had Appellee been free to leave.”

12/11/2019

1. “Can an appellate court disregard the issue of error preservation so that the State has a remedy when a capital murder case is dismissed because of the State’s own actions in disappearing a confidential informant?”
2. “Can an appellate court reverse a trial court’s dismissal under TRE 508 without ever addressing the untrustworthiness of the State’s position that the State does not know the identity of the confidential informant?”

12/11/2019

“The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in finding that there was harm from the admission of State’s Exhibits 22 and 23 as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

12/04/2019

“The appellate court applied an important question of state law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the court of criminal appeals when it mistakenly merged the corpus delicti standard of review with the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency of the evidence standard of review–misapplying both. ”

11/20/2019

“Texas Penal Code section 42.07(a)(7) is a content-based restriction that restricts a real and substantial amount of speech as protected by the First Amendment; speech which invades privacy interests of the listener has never been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a category of unprotected speech.”

11/20/2019

“The trial court excluded evidence of the defendant’s particular circumstances as irrelevant to the objective reasonable person standard for duress. Did the court of appeals err in finding an abuse of discretion by the trial court?”

11/20/2019

1. “The Eleventh Court of Appeals decided an issue that is contrary to a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in that the Appeals Court decided the legal sufficiency in this case in a way that is contrary to the record and it failed to apply the legal authorities to the facts of Petitioner’s case?”
2. “The Eleventh Court of Appeals decided an Issue that is contrary to a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in that the Appeals Court did not apply the sufficiency legal standard set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 to the facts in the Petitioner’s case?”
3. “The trial court erred when it denied Petitioner’s motion for directed verdict because the Petitioner was not guilty under the standard identified by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Jackson and Brooks respectfully?”

11/20/2019

“In Trinidad v. State, 312 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) this Court held Article V, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution was not implicated unless evidence that a number other than exactly twelve jurors voted on a verdict received by the trial court. The uncontroverted evidence from Appellant’s Motion for New Trial was a non-petit juror deliberated and voted on Appellant’s verdict. Did the Court of Appeals commit error in holding Appellant’s Article V, Section 13 and statutory claims under 33.01 and 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure were procedurally defaulted?”

11/20/2019

State represented by the SPA

1. “The court of appeals decided a facial overbreadth claim that was not preserved at trial or raised on appeal.”
2. “Is Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7), which prohibits harassing electronic communications, facially unconstitutional?”

11/06/2019

State represented by SPA

“When a defendant is charged with ‘assault by occlusion’ pursuant to Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(B), does the denial of occlusion and admission to causing different injuries entitle him to an instruction on simple assault?”

11/06/2019

“The Court of Appeals erred by finding that the evidence was legally sufficient to find Appellant guilty of interfering with child custody because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly violated the express terms of a judgment or order when Appellant was never served the order, never saw the order, and never had the terms of the order explained to him in either open court or in any other manner.”

11/06/2019

State represented by SPA

1. “Can an officer’s attempt to detain or arrest a suspect, which is otherwise lawful, be tainted by an earlier illegality and thereby negate evading’s lawful-arrest-or-detention element, just as evidence is tainted under fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree?”
2. “Will discovery of an arrest warrant necessarily render an attempted seizure on the warrant “lawful” (despite an earlier illegality) for purposes of evading arrest?”
3. “If an earlier illegality can taint the officer’s attempted detention, does discovery of a warrant provide an independent source for the detention or attenuate the taint?”

10/23/2019

1. “Based on these facts, does the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ decision conflict with Kelly v. State, for granting Counsel’s motion to withdraw and declaring the appeal frivolous, without first satisfying Petitioner’s express request to gain access to the appellate record in order to meaningfully respond to the Ander’s [sic] Brief? Kelly, 436 S.W.Sd 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).”
2. “Based on these facts, was Petitioner denied his due process and equal protection rights as declared by Anders v. California, for withholding the Appellate Record from Petitioner, unless he could provide the court with the monetary [sic] expense of $688.00? Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396.”
3. “Once Counsel files a motion to withdraw and an Ander’s [sic] Brief, should it be Counsel’s responsility [sic] to provide access of the appellate record to the Petitoiner [sic], in order to meaningfully respond to the Ander’s [sic] Brief?”

10/23/2019

1. "The Court of Appeals erred in holding the State's petition to obtain the Appellant's cell phone records set forth the "specific and articulable facts" required by federal law under 18 U.S.C. section 2703(d)."
2. "The Court of Appeals erred in holding the State’s acquisition of Petitioner’s historical cell phone records under an order issued under the federal stored communications act without a showing of probable cause in the petition was reasonable under the guarantees of privacy in Article I section 9 of the Texas constitution."

10/09/2019

1. “Does the ability to search a suitcase incident to a lawful arrest turn on the nature of the container?”
2. “Did the Fourth Court err in finding that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) could not be reconciled with this Court’s opinion in State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)?”

10/09/2019

“In Talent v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1974), peace officers were distinguished from firefighters, who ‘(have) no roving commission to detect crime or to enforce the criminal law.’ Unlike fire marshals, who are peace officers, firefighters do not have general law-enforcement powers. Thus, absent an exigency that allows an officer to enter without a warrant, if a firefighter enters a home to extinguish fires or save lives and notices contraband even in plain view, that firefighter’s knowledge does not ‘impute’ to a peace officer, and the officer should Be prohibited from entering the home without a warrant.”

10/09/2019

“In holding the evidence legally insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for failing to register, specifically, that the State failed to prove that the defendant had a duty to register with the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, where there was at least ‘some evidence’ (and specifically, direct evidence of the fact) that the Sheriff’s Office was the ‘local law-enforcement agency’ with which Herron was required to register, rather than decide merely whether there was legally sufficient evidence that, when viewed in its proper context and in the light most favorable to the verdict, could support a rational inference that Herron was, indeed, required to register with the Sheriff’s Office, the Eighth Court improperly required the State to meet its evidentiary burden via the Court’s preferred manner of evidentiary proof, effectively increasing the State’s burden.”

10/09/2019

1. “Did the court of appeals err in holding that misdemeanor assault by striking in the face was not a lesser-included offense of family violence assault by impeding breath or circulation?”
2. “Do multiple physical injuries inflicted in a single attack constitute separately actionable crimes of assault or are they part of a single assault?”
3. “Should Irving v. State, 176 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), be overruled in light of other developments in our caselaw?”

10/02/2019

State represented by SPA

“Can you have a ‘false testimony’ claim without testimony or falsity?”

10/02/2019

“The Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the officer who stopped Hardin’s vehicle lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for failing to maintain a single lane by swerving into another lane, whether or not this movement could be done safely.”

10/02/2019

“Is Appellant entitled to an instruction pursuant to Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when there is a factual dispute regarding the officer’s credibility and a conflict between his testimony and his dashcam video?”

09/25/2019

“Can an officer act in objective good faith by relying on the magistrate’s approval of a warrant that is defective in form?”

09/25/2019

“Did the court of appeals err in holding that conviction in Count Two for assault on a family member did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment?”

09/25/2019

1. “Whether permitting a key prosecution witness to testify remotely by videoconference from Montana violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment (3 R.R. 158-68; 4 R.R. 52-56).”
2. “Whether the court of appeals erroneously ignored well-established Supreme Court precedent when it conducted the harm analysis of the Confrontation Clause violation.”

09/18/2019

State represented by SPA

“Do questions that would objectively aid a search for a kidnapped or missing person fall within New York v. Quarles’s public safety exception to Miranda?”

09/11/2019

“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that police could not lawfully enter a hotel room to help a hotel manager evict a guest engaged in criminal activity.”

09/11/2019

“In a sufficiency analysis, may a reviewing court uphold a conviction where the offense is defined by technical elements beyond the understanding of an ordinary factfinder if no evidence on the elements was presented at trial?”

08/22/2019

1. “Justice Rodriguez’s dissent contains the same criticisms of the challenged statute that were addressed in 1983 by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kramer v. Price. Kramer v. Price struck down the previous version of Penal Code § 42.07. The defects described in Justice Rodriguez’s dissent and in Kramer v. Price have not been resolved.”
2. “The Fourth Court of Appeals’ decision, and the text of the challenged statute depart from accepted social norms and common understandings of the meaning of the word “harassment.’ The Fourth Court’s majority opinion, and the challenged statute, risk the criminalization of conduct that would not generally be considered ‘criminal’ by people of ordinary intelligence. Further, because of this disconnect between common sense and the text of the statute, the challenged statute chills emotional speech, hyperbolic speech, metaphor, sharply critical speech and sexual overtures; TRAP § 66.3 (f).”
3. “Texas Courts’ attempts to construe § 42.07 have led to baffling decisions that show no discernible logic or pattern that can be followed. The resulting authorities constitute a case by case evaluation of whether the subject speech makes reference to an ‘ultimate sex act.’ As a result of this lack of clear guidance, the statute is overly broad and chills too much speech.”
4. “The Court of Appeals should settle this important question because the statute unconstitutionally delegates prosecutorial decision-making and because the potential chilling effect is broad, TRAP § 66.3(b).”

08/21/2019

1. "Did Williams preserve his request for the lesser-included offense of human trafficking when he failed to identify any evidence supporting this request and denied committing any offense?"
2. "Did the court of appeals err by concluding that the lesser-included offense of human trafficking was a rational alternative to continuous human trafficking?"
3. "Did the court of appeals err by automatically reversing Williams’ conviction rather than applying the standard required by Almanza?"

08/21/2019

Can a jury charge applying an unalleged reckless culpable mental state for aggravated assault in a unitary application instruction cause egregious harm when applying that same reckless culpable mental state as a lesser-included offense would not even be error?

06/26/2019

“The Fifth District Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s decision in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.”

06/26/2019

“Did the 13th Court of Appeals err in the analysis for error considering the evidence in the record of this case?”

06/26/2019

The panel erred when it failed to find the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every element of the offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact, especially considering the panel unilaterally substituted a date of offense contradictory to the indictment and the court’ charge which created double jeopardy issues.

06/05/2019

The Eighth Court erred in upholding the trial court’s ruling that the second, in-car session of Lujan’s interview was not a continuation of the first, interview-room session, because: (1) under the Bible factors, the second-session interview was a continuation of the first; and (2) requiring police to re-Mirandize a suspect if the police engage in ambiguous conduct that could be construed as terminating, or setting a temporal limitation on, the interrogation (and attendant Miranda rights) undermines the ease and clarity of Miranda’s application by requiring officers to continually second-guess whether they made any such potentially ambiguous statements.

06/05/2019

1. “Did the court of appeals err in finding Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated on three separate occasions despite evidence showing that: (1) Appellant did not preserve error for two of the three partial closures; (2) members of the public were in fact watching the proceedings during each of the three partial closures; and (3) the trial court made adequate findings to support the partial closures?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err in its harm analysis by overemphasizing the impact of the admission of the CSLI evidence as important to impeach Appellant’s credibility when Appellant’s credibility was damaged from the outset, and the admission of the CSLI evidence was limited and merely cumulative of other evidence showing Appellant’ relationship with and proximity to the co-defendant?”

06/05/2019

State represented by the SPA

1. “Does Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(b), the ‘good faith’ exception, apply to warrants that do not have the magistrate’s name printed or typed under his signature?”
2. “In a motion to suppress evidence obtained with a warrant, does the defendant bear the burden of negating the ‘good faith’ exception?”
3. “Does Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 28.01, § 1(6), governing hearings on motions to suppress, allow a trial court to ignore a mode of evidence it made necessary?”
4. “The court of appeals should abate and remand to the trial court for findings and conclusions requested by the State.”

05/08/2019

“Whether or not the 8th Court of Appeals erred in finding that Appellant waived his right to a hearing on a properly presented and filed motion for new trial?”

05/01/2019

1. "Is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when he testifies that he did not commit the charged offense and, at most, he admits to committing a separate lesser-included offense?"
2. "Does an appellate court correctly apply the standard of review for harm when it fails to consider significant evidence of guilt and the defensive theory put forth at trial, which was that the defendant did not commit the charged offense, not that he committed it in self-defense?"

04/10/2019

1. “The court of appeals erred in concluding that section 22.011(f) of the Texas Penal Code requires the State to prove commission of an actual bigamy offense to elevate Appellant’s punishment range for sexual assault to a first-degree felony offense.”
2. “The court of appeals’ decision requiring the State to prove an actual bigamy offense under section 22.011(f) of the Texas Penal Code is contrary to Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).”
3. “The court of appeals erred in disregarding the clarification contained in footnote 9 of Arteaga merely because it was relegated to a footnote.”

04/10/2019

“Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the enhanced penalty provision for sexual assault under Section 22.011(f) does not require proof of bigamous conduct and can be triggered solely by evidence that Petitioner was married at the time the offense was committed?”

04/10/2019

“In holding the evidence legally insufficient to support two of Miranda’s convictions, the Court of Appeals did not follow this Court’s case of Miller v. State, 457 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), concerning the closely-related crimes exception to the corpus delicti rule, improperly holding that the exception did not apply because the temporal relationship of one year between the offenses was too long, even though they were all part of a single criminal episode, and there were multiple victims that were not aware of each other.”

04/10/2019

State represented by SPA

“Does the enhancement under Penal Code § 22.011(f) require the State to prove the defendant committed bigamy?”

04/10/2019

1. “Did the court of appeals err by reversing the trial court’s discovery sanction order under a theory not raised by the State?”
2. “Was Appellee’s discovery request sufficient under the Michael Morton Act?”
3. “Is the State estopped to challenge the sufficiency of Appellee’s discovery request because it produced discovery in response to the request?”

03/20/2019

1. “The court of appeals erred by concluding that a 112 day delay was presumptively prejudicial based on potential delay that had not yet occurred and by weighing the first Barker factor against the State.”
2. “The court of appeals erred by concluding that the State was responsible for the delay and by weighing the second Barker factor against the State.”
3. “The court of appeals erred by weighing the third Barker factor against the State without any evidence that Lopez asserted his right to a speedy trial.”

03/20/2019

State represented by SPA

“Is a prior conviction for family violence under Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A) always a guilt issue simply because it can be, and often is, used as a jurisdictional element?”

02/27/2019

“Whether a defendant’s failure to admit the exact manner and means of an assault as set forth in a charging instrument is a sufficient basis to deny a jury charge on self-defense.”

02/13/2019

1. “The Fourteenth Court erred by holding that a magistrate could not infer from the warrant affidavit that an auto body shop would have a surveillance system. The Fourteenth Court held that before a magistrate could consider common knowledge, the matter must be ‘beyond dispute,’ a civil standard the Fourteenth Court grafted onto Fourth Amendment law.”
2. “The Fourteenth Court erred by holding that when officers see a surveillance system recording a location where a crime occurred two weeks prior, they do not have probable cause to seize the system’s hard drive unless they know what is on the hard drive prior to examining it.”
3. “The Fourteenth Court erred by holding that the error required reversal, even under the standard for non-constitutional error, where the State’s remaining evidence was overwhelming and the defense non-existent.”

02/13/2019

“Did the court of appeals fail to apply to the standard of review correctly in conducting its Brady analysis?”

02/06/2019

“Whether the court of appeals erred by striking down the verdict of the jury that Metcalf was guilty as a party to the sexual assault of her daughter,

1. by conflating the requirements of subsections 7.02(a)(2) and 7.02(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code and thus imposing upon the State an additional evidentiary burden than that required by subsection 7.02(a)(3); and
2. by failing to evaluate the cumulative and combined weight of the evidence incriminating Metcalf, choosing instead to view each piece of evidence in isolation and finding it insufficient standing alone to support the jury’s verdict.”

01/30/2019

1. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted to prove knowledge of contraband and intent to possess contraband under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence to rebut the defensive theory that the defendant lacked knowledge of the presence of contraband.”
3. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence to prove the identity of the person who possessed the contraband.”
4. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that prior possession and use of contraband may be admitted under the doctrine of chances.”

01/19/2019

1. “Did the court of appeals err by failing to recognize municipalities’ authority, granted pursuant to the doctrine of home-rule cities and by Texas Penal Code § 42.12(d), to ban the discharge of firearms?”
2. “Did the lower court err by holding the San Antonio Ordinance should be construed as a strict liability crime?”
3. “Did the court of appeals misconstrue the doctrine of in pari materia by requiring that all elements in the provisions of law being compared must be identical?”

01/09/2019

1. “The trial court’s order correcting its prior judgment was signed while the trial court retained plenary power. Although labeled as a ‘Nunc Pro Tunc Order,’ the court of appeals concluded that the order was merely a modification of the judgment and not an order ‘nunc pro tunc.’ The court of appeals reasoned that a ‘nunc pro tunc’ order/judgment, by definition, can only be entered after the trial court loses plenary power. Texas case law and the rules of appellate procedure suggest that the majority is incorrect. This Court should clarify the issue.”
2. “Trial court’s order correcting a clerical error in the judgment is a valid nunc pro tunc order. Under Texas law, a nunc pro tunc order is an ‘appealable order[’] under Tex. R. App. P. 26.2 (a)(1). As such, Appellant had 30 days to file his notice of appeal. Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, isn’t the dissenting opinion of the Second Court of Appeals correct in concluding that Appellant’s appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?”

12/12/2018

1. “What quantum of evidence must the accused present to avail himself of self-defense/defense of others when the alleged victim was not a primary threat?”
2. “Does a Defendant’s intent to exercise self-defense/defense of others transfer to other assailants when the Defendant is only confronted with the fists of the primary threat?”

12/12/2018

“These cases were selected to address an issue reserved by this Court in Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. State, 305 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The issue was raised by motion to retax costs and a motion for new trial. There was a contested hearing in which evidence was offered before the trial court. The parties stipulate that they requested a court reporte[r] and that a court reporte[r] appeared to transcribe the hearing at issue. However, when the record was filed before the court of appeals, no reporter’s record was filed. The record was the subject matter of the hearing that was the issue to be appealed to the court of appeals. Without the record, it was presumed that all of the evidence offered supported the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, the petitioner asked for a new trial. The court of appeals denied the request. This was error.”

12/12/2018

1. “The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that appellant’s Miller v. Alabama claim was forfeited by inaction.”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred by ruling the age of the defendant at the time of the offense is an affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the burden of proof.”
3. “Even if defendants bear the burden to prove when they were born, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the instant judgment because the trial court never secured an express waiver from appellant, admission from appellant, or finding of fact that appellant was indeed over the age of eighteen [18] on October 22, 2014.”

12/12/2018

“Following this Court’s recent decision in Shortt v. State, when an appellant timely files a notice of appeal to appeal his conviction, must he file an additional notice of appeal to maintain his appeal of the conviction if the trial court later signs an order or judgment permitting ‘shock’ probation?”

12/12/2018

1. “The court of appeals erred in determining that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for accident involving injury–failure to stop and render aid.”
2. “The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s refusal to give jury instruction on mistake of fact.”

12/12/2018

APPELLANT’S

“Whether the First Court of Appeals erred when it misinterpreted Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) and failed to apply Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) in determining that the summoning witness/mileage fee under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 102.011 was not facially unconstitutional because the court cost was for a direct expense incurred by the State even though the statute does not direct the funds collected to be used for a legitimate criminal justice purpose?”

STATE’S

“This Court should overrule Carson, Peraza, and Salinas and return to the original understanding of Article II Section I of the Texas Constitution, which did not impose limitations on the Legislature’s ability to assess court costs.”

12/05/2018

“While reviewing a violation of the Michael Morton Act, the Court of Appeals erred in its materiality analysis.”

12/05/2018

“In concluding that Piper’s trial counsel may have had a reasonable strategic reason for failing to request a voluntary-conduct charge instruction, the court of appeals reasoned that attorneys are under no duty to raise every defense available. But counsel did raise a voluntary-conduct defense—he just didn’t then ask for the corresponding charge instruction.  In ignoring this, did the court of appeals so far depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court’s power of supervision?”

12/05/2018

State represented by SPA

1. “Is the failure to admonish about immigration consequences under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a)(4) harmful when the defendant was already deportable at the time of his guilty plea due to prior convictions?”
2. “Is the failure to admonish about immigration consequences under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a)(4) harmful when the defendant knew he was already deportable at the time of his guilty plea due to prior convictions?”
3. “Was the failure to admonish about immigration consequences under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a)(4) harmful when Appellant was already deportable, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and he was morally motivated to plead guilty?”

12/05/2018

1. “The evidence is legally insufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for deceptive business practice where Appellant did not make any affirmative misrepresentation, the State’s theory of liability was based on an omission rather than an act, and the complainant accurately understood the commercial terms when the transaction occurred.”
2. “Whether deceptive business practice is a ‘nature-of-conduct’ or ‘circumstance-of-conduct’ offense and whether the jury must agree unanimously that the defendant committed the same specific act of deception to convict him.”

12/05/2018

1. “Whether, as a matter of law, evidence that has been forgotten by a defendant is unknown, for purposes of the newly-discovered-evidence rule, only if the defendant forgot about it because of a physical or mental condition, such as amnesia or repression, that was caused by a traumatic event, debilitating injury, or disease, the existence of which can be confirmed by science or medicine.”
2. “Whether, as a matter of law, a defendant who fails to recall evidence, once known but since forgotten, has not, for purposes of the newly discovered evidence rule, exercised diligence to discover or obtain such evidence.”

12/05/2018

1. “By holding that Michael’s waiver of the right to appeal was enforceable and that the trial court’s ‘admonishment’ that induced Michael to plead guilty did not violate Due Process and Article 26.13, the Eighth Court’s opinion conflicts with decisions from this Court and the United States Supreme Court.”
2. “By holding that Michael’s waiver of the right to appeal was enforceable and by ruling that the trial court’s misstatements about its ability to cumulate the sentences—made as it sought to induce Michael to plead guilty—did not invalidate the plea, the Eighth Court’s opinion creates direct conflicts with other courts of appeals on issues now pending before this Court.”
3. “By relying directly on bad/outdated law for the timing of an election and on the impossible scenario of the court sentencing Michael even if he pleaded guilty to the jury to reject Michael’s appeal, and by not addressing Michael’s argument that the trial court coerced him to plead guilty after he said he wanted a trial on trial day, the Eighth Court’s opinion departs from an acceptable course of judicial proceedings and calls for this Court to exercise its power of supervision.”

11/21/2018

“In an issue of first impression, did the court of appeals correctly determine that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction for ‘failure to appear & bail jumping’ when a trial court revokes a defendant’s bail in open court, remands the defendant to jail, and the defendant fails to report to jail as ordered?”

10/10/2018

1. “Where this Court and other appellate courts have found evidence sufficient to support an ‘alteration’ under the tampering statute when an item’s physical or geographical location is changed, did Stahmann err in failing to uphold Appellant’s tampering conviction based on his undisputed ‘alteration’ of the pill bottle’s location by throwing it away from himself and the crash site, over a fence, and into a patch of shrubbery?”
2. “Where the ‘dispositive inquiry is whether law enforcement noticed the object before the defendant tried to hide it and maintained visual contact’ of the object, and law enforcement only learned of the existence and location of the evidence from a third-party witness well after Appellant threw it away, did Appellant ‘conceal’ the pill bottle?”

10/03/2018

1. “The Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence by providing a jury instruction on ‘joint possession’ that added to the statutory definition of ‘possession.’”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred in alternatively holding it was not error to refuse Appellant’s requested jury instruction on ‘mere presence’ while holding the jury instruction on ‘joint possession’ was appropriate.”

09/26/2018

“Whether, as stated by Justice Gray in his dissent from Appellant’s motion for rehearing, the evidence allowed the jury to have reasonably inferred that the second assault occurred on or before the victim’s fourteenth birthday?”

09/26/2018

1. “When a statute, Section 165.152 of the Texas Occupations Code, generally proscribes conduct that is also proscribed by a more specific statute, Section 165.153 providing for a lesser range of punishment, is it a violation of due process and due course of law to punish the offender in accordance with the broader statute calling for a greater range of punishment?”
2. “Is it ever proper for a Court to construe a statute, Section 165.153 of the Texas Occupations Code, in a manner that renders the entire statute superfluous?”

09/12/2018

“The opinion of the court of appeals is in conflict with opinions of this Court holding there must be evidence of dangerous or reckless operation of a vehicle to support a finding it was used as a deadly weapon and the occurrence of a collision or consumption of alcohol do not establish those elements.”

09/12/2018

Does a failure to object to a driver’s license suspension at trial bar complaint on appeal?

09/12/2018

“When a defendant is acquitted on a defense of a third person theory after stabbing a person engaged in a fight with a friend, does the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause as articulated in Ashe v. Swenson and this Court’s opinions bar his subsequent prosecution for stabbing another person who was not fighting?”

08/22/2018

Does Doan apply when a defendant enters a plea of “true” to new criminal offenses in a motion to proceed or probation revocation and does the true plea legally bind the defendant guilty in the new criminal offenses?

08/22/2018

1. “The Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in suggesting that the sustaining of a Franks motion and the purging of false statements from a search warrant affidavit triggers a heightened legal standard of ‘clear’ probable cause with regard to the remaining allegations in the affidavit.”
2. “The Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a strong smell of alcohol on the breath of a driver involved in a serious motor vehicle accident does not furnish probable cause for a blood warrant.”

07/25/2018

State represented by SPA

1. “Is Tex. Penal Code § 21.16(b) a content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny?”
2. “May a court of appeals find a statute unconstitutional based on a manner and means that was not charged?”
3. “Is Tex. Penal Code § 21.16(b) facially constitutional?”

06/20/2018

1. “The court of appeals erred in holding that § 551.143 does not violate the First Amendment.”
2. “The court of appeals erred in holding that § 551.143 is not void for vagueness.”
3. “The court of appeals erred in failing to address claims raised by Riley that were material to its disposition of the issues.”

06/20/2018

State represented by SPA

1. “Is ‘possession with intent to deliver’ a predicate offense for engaging in organized criminal activity because it falls within ‘unlawful manufacture, delivery . . . of a controlled substance’ which is one of EOCA’s enumerated predicate offenses?”
2. "Can an EOCA conviction predicated on an offense that is not a predicate be reformed to that necessarily subsumed offense?"

06/20/2018

1. "Whether the court of appeals properly determined that the postconviction DNA testing results established a reasonable probability that the appellant would not have been convicted had they been available at the time of trial?"
2. "Whether the court of appeals gave proper deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility or demeanor?"
3. "Whether the court of appeals considered all the evidence before the trial court in making its article 64.04 finding before determining that post-conviction DNA testing results established a reasonable probability that the appellant would not have been convicted had they been available at the time of trial?"

06/20/2018

1. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Government Code section 551.143 applies to conduct rather than speech and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny.”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Government Code section 551.143 is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”
3. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Government Code section 551.143 is not unconstitutionally vague.”

06/13/2018

“Did the Court of Appeals error in holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to play a video of a lion attempting to maul an infant during its closing arguments?”

06/06/2018

“In finding the evidence legally sufficient, did the Sixth Court of Appeals fail to consider: was the jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?”

06/06/2018

1. “Did the court of appeals err in concluding that §551.143 did not violate the First Amendment?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err in finding that §551.143 was not void for vagueness?”

06/06/2018

State represented by SPA

“Is a peace officer moonlighting as private security ‘lawfully discharging an official duty’ for purposes of proving assault on a public servant when acting under Tex. Alco. Bev. Code § 101.07, which dictates: ‘all peace officers in the state’ ‘shall enforce the provisions of this code.’”

05/23/2018

State represented by SPA

“Is possession with intent to deliver a predicate offense for engaging in organized criminal activity because it falls within ‘unlawful manufacture, delivery . . . of a controlled substance’ which is one of EOCA’s enumerated predicate offenses?”

04/25/2018

“Is it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to rely on a driver’s implied consent to a blood draw when the driver was involved in an accident, there is probable cause to believe he is intoxicated, and where the driver’s own unconsciousness prevents the officer from effectively obtaining the driver’s actual consent.”

04/25/2018

1. “The First Court erred in holding the trial court abused its discretion in excluding impeachment evidence. As the dissenting justice pointed out, the appellant’s offer of proof failed to establish a causal or logical relationship between the excluded evidence and the witness’s alleged bias. The First Court’s opinion provides precedent for appellate courts to reverse trial courts based on speculation of what cross-examination might have revealed, rather than what the offer of proof showed it would reveal.”
2. “The First Court erred by failing to consider the weakness of the defensive evidence in conducting its harm analysis. The First Court looked only at the State’s evidence, and ignored the fact that the appellant failed to produce evidence that would support a jury’s finding that he acted in self-defense.”

04/18/2018

1. “Does a charging instrument that does not identify the defendant by name, but which is preceded by a caption that does identity the defendant by name, meet the jurisdictional requirement that a charging instrument name a ‘person’ as required by article V, §12(b) of the Texas Constitution?”
2. “Whether Cook v. State is outdated in light of Teal v. State and Kirkpatrick v. State?”

04/18/2018

1. “Does a defendant preserve error regarding juror unanimity when the instruction requested is both an incorrect statement of the law and would not have corrected the error complained of on appeal?”
2. “Does a defendant suffer harm when a jury charge allows for non-unanimous verdicts as to contact or penetration of either a child’s sexual organ or anus, but the evidence is overwhelming as to one charge?”

04/11/2018

“The court of appeals’ [sic] committed a structural error by denying the appellant his right’s of due process. The second issue is whether the appellant has a right to file a pro se appeal brief after the court denies appellant his right to find new appeal counsel, and after the court has allowed the appointed attorney to withdraw from the case.”

04/11/2018

1. “Is the constitutional harm standard the proper test for harm when there was a mere delay in the election versus no election at all and the jury is charged on a specific incident?”
2. “How specific must the factual rendition of a single incident in the jury charge be to serve the purposes the election requirement?”

04/11/2018

1. Whether the right to a jury trial mandated by U.S. Const. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and U.S. Const. art. III § 2, and the concepts set out by this Court in Apprendi and Blakely, is violated by the procedure utilized by the Court of Appeals, that is, a judicial finding of an element not alleged in the indictment or submitted to the jury, which is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition, an indispensable part of our criminal justice system, by making appellate courts fact finders as to an element not considered by the jury?”
2. “Whether the right to a jury trial and Due Process required by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), was violated when the Court of Appeals reformed the Petitioner’s conviction to the conviction of a higher offense, when such higher offense was not determined by the jury, the factfinder resulting in a reformed verdict which was not rendered by the jury or the trial court?”

03/28/2018

1. “The court of appeals misapplies the standard of review when examining article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”
2. “The court of appeals’ opinion puts it in conflict with other courts of appeals, which have applied constitutional violation analysis to private individuals under article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”
3. “As Petitioner was the prevailing party at the Motion to Suppress, the court of appeals should have deferred to the trial court and presume it found a violation of law sufficient to trigger the Texas Exclusionary Rule.”

 03/28/2018

1. “The current test for determining whether an out-of-state offense is substantially similar to an enumerated Texas offense is too broad. Accordingly, this Court should disavow that test and replace it with one that only compares the elements of the respective offenses.”
2. “Even if not disavowed, the court of appeals misapplied the current test when it concluded that the military’s former sodomy-with-a-child statute is not substantially similar to Texas’s sexual-assault statute.”

03/28/2018

“The Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the conflict between the new test results and the results presented at trial, as well as the defensive evidence presented by appellant, when deciding whether the new test results cast doubt on the validity of the conviction.”

03/21/2018

“The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s allowing evidence of a drug test without testimony of the chemist who performed the testing.”

03/21/2018

“Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that trial counsel’s advice was a misrepresentation of the law that rendered Briggs’s plea involuntary when the advice was based on the controlling precedent that existed at the time counsel’s advice was given?”

02/14/2018

1. “The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23(a), violations of the Federal Stored Communication Act (“SCA”) and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 18.21 do not require suppression of evidence pertaining to the warrantless pinging of a cellphone because: (1) the plain-language of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23(a) states that no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of Texas or federal law shall be admitted in evidence against the accused; (2) Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23(a) is intended to provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment; and (3) it is irrelevant that the SCA and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 18.21 do not provide that suppression is available since they are laws of Texas and the United States, and neither prohibits suppression of illegally obtained evidence under Art. 38.23(a).”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred by holding that Appellant was not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the real-time, tracking-data that was illegally seized because under the Fourth Amendment and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23(a), a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in real-time tracking-data regardless of whether he is in a private or public location.”

02/07/2018

1. “Did the majority opinion correctly hold that TEX.R.EVID. 103 trumps TEX.R.APP. P. 33.1 and relieves an appellant of the need to have informed the trial court of the legal basis for admitting the proffered evidence?”
2. “Does the majority opinion conflict with precedent from this Court when it holds that an appellate complaint about the exclusion of defense evidence need not comport with the appellant’s trial objection?”
3. “Did the majority opinion contradict this Court’s precedent by holding, in the alternative, that Appellant preserved his constitutional complaints about the exclusion of defense evidence with, among other things, a general remark, made during opening statement, and his argument that the victim’s testimony from the first voir dire hearing was relevant so the jury could “get the whole picture”?”
4. “Did the majority opinion properly deal with Appellant’s en masse first offer by plucking out items when the offer contained other material that was inadmissible?”
5. “Did the majority opinion correctly find constitutional violations in the exclusion of defense evidence?”

02/07/2018

"Did the Fifth Court of Appeals err by holding and determining that the State had a compelling interest in protecting children, including Fineberg's biological children, from sexual exploitation without also determining whether the community supervision modification prohibiting Fineberg's contact with her children was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest?"

01/24/2018

1. “Does an information that tracks the language of section 42.01(a)(8) provide a defendant sufficient notice that he displayed a firearm in a manner calculated to alarm?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err by applying a First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rule to a Sixth Amendment complaint?”
3. “Is the term ‘alarm’ within the context of section 42.01(a)(8) inherently vague?”

01/24/2018

“The court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly granted the defendant/appellee’s motion to suppress evidence that revealed the results of testing of the blood of the defendant/appellee.”

01/10/2018

“The lower court erred in holding that an indictment for criminal attempt is fundamentally defective when it does not allege the constituent elements of the underlying offense attempted.”

01/10/2018

1. “The Appellate Court Improperly Reviewed the Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Chambers pursuant to § 37.10 of the Texas Penal Code when it Refused to Acknowledge that the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement was Acting in Contravention of its Legal Authority.”
2. “This Court Should Summarily Grant this Petition for Discretionary Review and Remand the Case to The Court of Appeals Because of That Court’s Failure to Comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”
3. “The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to Submit an Instruction to the Jury on the Applicable Law Regarding the Distinction Between an Employee and a Volunteer Reservist.”
4. “The Difference Between the Class A Misdemeanor and the Felony Enhancement Pursuant to § 37.10 of the Texas Penal Code is a Distinction Without a Difference. In Addition, the Appellate Court’s Reliance Upon an Improper Application of Law is Legally Insufficient to Uphold a Finding of an ‘Intent to Defraud.’”

12/13/2017

1. “Has the court of appeals misapplied Blueford v. Arkansas by holding that two jury notes indicating the jury deadlocked on a lesser-included offense amount to an informal verdict of acquittal on the charged offense?”
2. “Do mere jury notes regarding a deadlock on a lesser-charge contain sufficient indicia to show the jury manifestly intended an informal verdict of acquittal?”
3. “Did Blueford v. Arkansas overrule this Court’s precedent that a jury’s report of its progress towards a verdict does not amount to an informal verdict of acquittal?”

12/13/2017

1. “The court of appeals employed the wrong analysis, when reviewing the record to determine whether ‘voluntary intoxication’ instruction was an error to include in Appellant’s punishment – phase jury charge.”
2. “The inclusion of an 8.04(a) instruction at punishment violates the Due Process Clause because it could mislead a rational jury into believing that it could not—as a matter of law—consider a defendant’s drug-addiction evidence as mitigation; thus the court of appeals holding that it is not a charge error conflicts with applicable holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court.”
3. “In it’s [sic] harm analysis of the State’s unconstitutional jury argument, the court of appeals did not address how that argument highlighted inadmiss[able] evidence and how it impermissibly increased the likelihood that the jury punished Appellant specifically for an extraneous crime.”

12/13/2017

State represented by SPA

“Are misstatements during a plea colloquy that a defendant’s sentences could be stacked enough to render a defendant’s plea involuntary without any record of what the defendant knew and why he pleaded guilty?”

12/06/2017

1. “What is the standard of review for evaluating a claim of legally insufficient evidence on the State’s non-evidentiary burden of persuasion in a claim of self-defense/defense of others?”
2. “Whether the intermediate-appellate court erred when it determined that the State met its non-evidentiary burden of persuasion and that Appellant was unjustified in acting in self-defense/defense of others.”
3. “Whether the trial court’s erroneous decision not to issue a requested-lesser-included offense was harmless as the intermediate-appellate court concluded in its re-issued opinion?”  

11/22/2017

“Has a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, where a police officer approaches a vehicle passenger, after the passenger has exited the vehicle, and conducts a warrantless search of the passenger’s pockets, in the driveway of the passenger’s house?”

11/15/2017

1. “Does the filing of a charging instrument containing non-statutory language prohibit the appellate court from considering the hypothetically correct jury charge in a sufficiency review?”
2. “Did the First Court of Appeals sit as a thirteenth juror when holding that a two-hour interval between the time of the stop and the breath test was not sufficient to prove the appellant's breath alcohol concentration was a 0.15 near the time of the offense?”

11/15/2017

1. “The Court of Appeals decided an important question of state law in a way that conflicts with applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals when it found the State’s opening argument to constitute error.”
2. “The Court of Appeals decided an important question of state law in a way that conflicts with applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals when it found the Appellant did not have to make a timely objection in order to preserve a claim of error related to the State’s opening argument.”
3. “The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in finding that an instruction to disregard would not have cured any potential prejudice in this case as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

11/08/2017

1. “Did the appellate court, in affirming the trial court’s decision to admit the police officer’s expert testimony despite the officer acknowledging he had no requisite qualifications in motorcycle accident reconstruction, violate Texas Rule of Evidence 702?”
2. “In relying on Nenno, instead of Kelly, did the appellate court apply an incorrect standard when determining that an accident reconstruction expert’s testimony was reliable even though he applied no scientific theory or testing from that field and he had no qualifications in the field of motorcycle accident reconstruction?
3. “Should the less rigid Nenno standard apply, as opposed to the Kelly standard, when an expert in a technical scientific field chose to not apply any of the scientific testing or theory to a particular case?

11/08/2017

“Did the court of appeals err in holding that Section 133.102(a)(1) of the Texas Local Government Code by which the ‘consolidated court cost’ was assessed is not facially unconstitutional?”

11/01/2017

“Did Appellant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his right of appeal by signing a boilerplate waiver?”

11/01/2017

1. “Where, regardless of whether the shock-probation order was ‘original’ or ‘amended,’ because it is a type of order identified as appealable under the plain language of article 44.01, and because the State’s notice of appeal was filed within 20 days from the amended order’s entry, the Eighth Court, in holding that the State’s notice of appeal was untimely and dismissing the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, failed to give effect to the plain language of article 44.01 and thus erred.”
2. “Where, by entering an amended order, the trial court indicated its intent to supercede its original shock-probation order, and where the trial court’s amended order contained additional fact findings that were a statutory prerequisite to the proper granting of shock probation, the Eighth Court erred in holding that it was the original (not the amended) order that constituted an ‘appealable’ order. The State’s notice of appeal from the amended order was therefore timely.”

11/01/2017

“Can the felonies of reckless or criminally negligent injury to a child or reckless or criminally negligent child endangerment underlie a felony-murder conviction when the act underlying the felony and the act clearly dangerous to human life are one and the same?”

11/01/2017

State represented by SPA

“Is a claim that counsel misadvised a defendant about the deportation consequences associated with a guilty plea cognizable on habeas despite Ex parte De Los Reyes’ holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively on habeas?”

10/25/2017

“Whether this Court should explicitly overrule Tarver and the concept of state collateral estoppel since collateral estoppel should not bar the State from prosecuting a criminal offense following to an adverse finding at a probation revocation hearing.”

10/25/2017

1. “In light of significant statutory changes, does Nelson v. State have continued validity when interpreting § 21.11 of the Texas Penal Code?”
2. “Under § 21.11 of the Texas Penal Code, what is a ‘breast’?”

10/18/2017

“The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard of ‘some evidence’ necessary to require a ‘formal competency hearing.’”

10/04/2017

1. “May this Court adhere to a rule that refuses to allow the consideration of legislative history to interpret a statute unless the statute is ambiguous, when the Legislature states that legislative history may be considered whether or not a statute is ambiguous?”
   1. “Must Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and its progeny be overruled to the extent they conflict with Texas Government Code Section 311.023, which Texas Penal Code Section 1.05(b) makes applicable to the Penal Code?”
2. “Does the organized retail theft statute admit of more than one reasonable interpretation with respect to whether the statute may be violated by a solitary actor committing ordinary shoplifting, and does consulting the plain language alone lead to absurd results that the legislature could not possibly have intended?”
3. “May a shoplifter violate the organized retail theft statute by committing ordinary shoplifting while acting alone?”

10/04/2017

State represented by SPA

1. “Is expert opinion testimony that a defendant holds himself out as a gang member—without proof he is one—relevant to sentencing?”
2. “In assessing harm, did the court of appeals err in failing to isolate the opinion testimony from the properly admitted photographs on which that opinion was based?”

09/27/2017

“Whether the Proponent of Evidence at Trial has the Burden of Showing Statutory Compliance in Response to an Objection under Article 38.23 (The Texas Exclusionary Rule).”

09/27/2017

State represented by SPA

“May the proponent of a video sufficiently prove its authenticity without the testimony of someone who either witnessed what the video depicts or is familiar with the functioning of the recording device?”

09/13/2017

State represented by SPA

1. “The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review for admission of evidence under Rule 412 and 107 in a manner that so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”
2. “The Court of Appeals’ failure to conduct a proper harm analysis so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

09/13/2017

“Does the record contain no evidence that Appellant was aware that any firearm would be, was being, or had been used or exhibited during the robbery, as the Ninth Court of Appeals held, when there is evidence that one of the intruders carried a long, rifle-like gun and that Appellant transported this intruder to Brown’s house directly before the robbery?”

09/13/2017

“Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the prior conviction for operating a watercraft while intoxicated was a final conviction?”

09/13/2017

1. “Whether the court of appeals failed to apply the tolling provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 12.05(b), in conflict with this Court’s decision in Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).”
2. “Whether the court of appeals’ harmless error analysis under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) properly weighed the factors in this case.”

09/13/2017

1. “The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction, because ‘no written appealable order’ existed when in fact the original judgment, nunc pro tunc, provided the Court of Appeals with a written appealable order.”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred in giving this appeal a new cause number and then stating there was no written appealable order where the remand to the trial court and subsequent notice of appeal was a continuation of the original appeal in Court of Appeals No. 05-13- 00016-CR.”
3. “The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing this cause for want of jurisdiction stating there was no appealable order which if stands allows the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court to deny Appellant due process of law in the continuing exercise of her right to appeal the trial court’s rationale for entering a defective order nunc pro tunc adding a deadly weapon finding to the judgement.”

09/13/2017

1. “The court of appeals erred by applying a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s granting of Appellee’s motion to suppress evidence, failing to give ‘almost total deference’ to the trial court’s findings of fact to support its conclusion that no exigent circumstances existed.”
2. “The court of appeals erred by considering evidence that did not become known to law enforcement until after the warrantless taking of Appellee’s blood.”

09/13/2017

“The court of appeals erred in affirming a fine included in the judgment which had not been orally pronounced by the trial court at sentencing.”

08/23/2017

State represented by SPA

“Can a conviction for a charged, but nonexistent, offense be reformed to a subsumed and proven offense that does exist?”

08/23/2017

“When a defendant files a timely notice of appeal from a judgment adjudicating his guilt and is later placed on shock community supervision, to complain on appeal about a condition of that community supervision must he file a new notice of appeal?”

08/23/2017

"Did the 13th Court of Appeals err in the analysis of 'harm' in this case and in finding any error harmless?"

08/23/2017

“Has a defendant who did not object to a trial court’s declaration of mistrial, despite an adequate opportunity to do so, impliedly consented to the mistrial?”

07/26/2017

“In DWI-second-offender cases, is a prior DWI conviction an offense element or a punishment enhancement?”

07/26/2017

State represented by SPA

1. “In the absence of a body, must the State prove the ‘fatal act of violence’ in order to convict someone of murder?”
2. “The court of appeals reviewed both the evidence and the elements of the offense in sequential, piecemeal fashion rather than cumulatively, and failed to respect the jury’s prerogative to draw inferences and weigh testimony.”
3. “Is the evidence sufficient to prove appellant murdered his wife?”

07/26/2017

1. “The Court of Appeals erroneously decided an important question of state law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals, by finding that the knowledge of supporting officers cannot be used to establish probable cause.”
2. “The Court of Appeals failed to conduct the required de novo review of whether the evidence known to Officer Quinn was sufficient to establish probable cause and that failure constitutes a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that calls for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.”

07/26/2017

1. “In a murder case, where there is no body, no direct evidence of a death and no direct evidence to show that Petitioner acted either intentionally or knowingly in causing the alleged victim’s death or acted with intent to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the alleged victim’s death, must the State prove a ‘fatal act of violence’ in order to convict a person of murder?”
2. “The Court of Appeals erred in finding the evidence sufficient to support the Petitioner’s conviction for murder when the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim was deceased and that her death was caused by a criminal act of Petitioner.”
3. “Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the evidence sufficient to support Petitioner's conviction?”
4. “The Court of Appeals rendition of crucial evidence in its opinion was erroneous and the Court of Appeals relied on this erroneous rendition of the evidence in finding the evidence sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction.”

06/28/2017

“The court of appeals erred by holding that there was charge error, even though the appellant never objected to or requested that the jury charge include a defensive issue of self-defense instruction to the defensive issue of the lesser-included offense.”

06/28/2017

“The Eighth Court’s holding that rule 25.2(g)’s jurisdictional bar does not apply to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction pending issuance of the mandate on a State’s interlocutory appeal–the basis of the Eighth Court’s ultimate conclusion that Macias’s premandate trial was improperly terminated and his retrial jeopardy barred–was erroneous and impermissibly abridged the State’s right to appeal under article 44.01.”

06/28/2017

State represented by SPA

1. “Is a waiver of the right to appeal following a plea of guilty without a recommended sentence invalid because the defendant could not know that an error would occur at the punishment phase?”
2. “Is the State’s waiver of its right to a jury trial adequate consideration to uphold a defendant’s waiver in the face of potential future errors and uncertain punishment?”
3. “Does the classification of an error affect the validity of an appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal?”
4. “May the trial court’s unobjected-to consideration of facts not in evidence be raised for the first time on appeal?”

06/07/2017

"In holding the evidence legally insufficient to support the defendant's convictions for engaging in organized criminal activity, specifically, that the State failed to prove that the defendant committed the predicate murders as a member of a criminal street gang, the Court of Appeals improperly required proof of the motive of the gang itself. Even after recognizing that the evidence showed that the defendant and his fellow gang members acted in concert in killing the victims, the Court of Appeals nevertheless improperly held that absent proof of why the gang attacked and killed the victims, the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to rationally conclude that the killings were a gang activity and that the defendant participated in the killings as a member of the gang."

06/07/2017

1. "The Eighth Court erred in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring, aand placing the burden upon, the State to establish that jail-recorded telephone conversations Villegas seeks to exclude pretrial are: (1) relevant to an elemental or evidentiary fact of consequence to be litigated at trial, (2) not unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, and (3) not inadmissible hearsay, where such determinations necessarily require the ever-changing context of a trial and the party claiming the protection of exclusionary rules of evidence bears the burden of proving his case in a pretrial motion." 
2. "The Eighth Court misapplied the standard for reviewing relevance determinations where its analysis for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding relevant evidence looked to whether, based on the trial court's personal evaluation of competing or available inferences, it is reasonable to reject the State's proffered inferences, when the proper standard looks to whether an appellate court can state with confidence that by no reasonable perception of common experience could it be determined that the proffered inference is one that is reasonably available from the evidence."

06/07/2017

State represented by SPA

"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reforming Appellant's judgment to reflect conviction for a Class B misdemeanor."

05/24/2017

State represented by SPA

"Is it error to declare trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence when, at the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant presented no evidence demonstrating that the investigation and additional evidence would have been beneficial?"

05/17/2017

1. "The Eighth Court erred in holding that evidence that Gonzalez had consumed ecstasy on the day of the murder was irrelevant to his state of mind and self-defense claim because the State failed to introduce evidence of the drug's half-life or the length of its effects, and that, despite any bearing it had on the central issue of self-defense or the relatively innocuous nature of the intoxication evidence, when compared to the severity of the charged offense (capital murder), its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
2. "The Eighth Court erred in holding that any erroneous admission of Gonzalez' possession and consumption of ecstasy the day of the murder constituted harmful error where the complained-of evidence was developed quickly through a single witness, the State did not allude to the evidence during closing arguments, and Gonzalez' defensive evidence was internally inconsistent and controverted by the State's evidence. In disregarding the weight of these factors, the Eighth Court erred in its application of the appropriate harm standard."

05/03/2017

"The court of appeals failed to apply this Court's decision in Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992) in determining that petitioner was not entitled to a lesser-included charge on manslaughter when the jury could reasonably have interpreted petitioner's mens rea as recklessness about causing death."

05/03/2017

1. "In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, the court of appeals failed to measure the evidence, as the court interpreted the evidence, against a hypothetically correct jury charge that included, as the dissent pointed out, a full parties charge and a correct description of the financial instrument stolen, as required under Garza Vega v. State, 267 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)."
2. "In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, the court of appeals erred in failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, thereby substituting its resolution of fact issues for that of the jury's. See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 319 n.12 (1979)."

05/03/2017

State represented by SPA

"Does the improved shoulder of a highway begin at the inside edge of the 'fog line,' the outside edge, or somewhere in between?"

04/26/2017

State represented by SPA

"In a capital case, did the two-justice panel fail to defer to the verdict, apply defunct sufficiency standards, and ignore inculpatory evidence when Appellant was the last person with the victims, had been rejected by them, fled the scene, had a .38—the likely weapon—had a .38 under his car seat the day after, had gun-shot residue on his pants and car seat, and acted suspiciously?"

04/12/2017

State represented by SPA

"Is it constitutional error to prevent defense counsel from asking a question during voir dire that could give rise to a valid challenge for cause?"

03/29/2017

State represented by SPA

1. "Does the improved shoulder of a road include the 'fog line?'"
2. "Alternatively, because the issue whether the improved shoulder includes the 'fog line' is unsettled, is there reasonable suspicion of a violation of driving on the improved shoulder when a driver drives on the 'fog line' but does not cross its outer edge?"
3. "Is driving on an improved shoulder 'necessary' 'to avoid a collision' under Tex. Transp. Code § 545.058(a)(7) simply because the driver is on a two-lane highway at night with a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction?"

03/08/2017

State represented by SPA

1. "Is the 'right' not to be subjected to improper jury argument forfeitable?"
2. "Is there a word so inflammatory that its mere mention in closing arguments incurably taints the entire trial?"

02/15/2017

"The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Beck had forfeited his right to challenge on habeas review the constitutionality of Texas Penal Code Section 21.12(a)(3), the statute of conviction, because he did not raise the issue at trial or on appeal. In dicta, the lower court implied that if the issue had been preserved, the court would have found the statute constitutional."

02/01/2017

"The trial court's failure to require an election by the State should not have resulted in a reversal when the testimony regarding multiple incidents of abuse was admissible, the descriptions of each incident were essentially the same, the jury was charged on only one offense, and the appellant's defense was the same across the board."

02/01/2017

1. "Is the evidence sufficient to prove aggravated assault with a deadly weapon when the State proves the offense alleged in the indictment, but there is a variance between the pleadings and proof as to the specific deadly weapon?"
2. "If, in the course of single criminal episode, Appellant assaults victim, immediately leaves the room to retrieve a deadly weapon and then continues assaultive conduct, does a court of appeals err in finding the evidence insufficient to prove that the deadly weapon was used 'during the commission' of the assault."

01/25/2017

"The Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in its application of Arizona v. Gant, in that it did not apply the totality of the circumstances when determining the validity of the search incident to arrest."

01/25/2017

State represented by SPA

1. "The court of appeals ignored the law governing the review of suppression rulings by, inter alia, considering the circumstances in isolation, focusing on their innocent nature, and generally failing to defer to the fact-finder."
2. "Under what circumstances is a reviewing court permitted to ignore a credible officer's inferences and deductions based on his training and experience?"

01/25/2017

State represented by SPA

"When the cocaine was seized after Appellant attempted to flee a reasonably timed traffic-stop-detention, does an alleged unlawful pre-arrest frisk and prolonged detention render the cocaine inadmissible?"

01/25/2017

1. "Appellant failed to preserve any of the complaints that underlie the court of appeals' opinion."
2. "Did the court of appeals misinterpret the record and thus misapply Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), which held that judges may not play any role in plea negotiation?"
3. "Should Moore be reconsidered and Appellant be estopped from complaining in this case?"

01/25/2017

1. "Whether a shopper's concealing merchandise inside her purse in a shopping cart gives rise to probable cause to arrest her for theft?"
2. "Whether a Suspect's innocent but unverifiable explanation for otherwise highly suspicious conduct negates probable cause? In particular, whether a shopper's claim that she intended to pay for items concealed in her purse while shopping negates probable cause to arrest her for theft?"

01/25/2017

1. "The Ninth Court of Appeals misapplied the standard set forth in Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), when it ignored the trial court's ability to disbelieve the affidavits provided in support of the appellant's motion for new trial and concluded the appellant established he would have elected for the jury to assess his punishment if he had received correct advice regarding his ineligibility for community supervision from the trial court."
2. "The Ninth Court of Appeals misapplied the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims when the court burdened the State to disprove prejudice and relied on speculation to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the appellant had received correct advice."

01/25/2017

1. "Did the court of appeals err in finding exigent circumstances existed?
2. "Can law enforcement create their own exigent circumstances?"

01/25/2017

"Whether there was probable cause to search Appellant's vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement when he entered a bar where narcotic activity was suspected, left three to five minutes later, and made 'furtive gestures' when police surrounded him to make a traffic stop?"

01/11/2017

"The 11th Court of Appeals panel erred by not addressing Appellant's argument in Appellant's Issue Number Two that evidence of an act committed in another state which did not violate a Texas penal law at the time of its commission, did not provide sufficient evidence to fulfil the statutory requirement that the state prove Appellant violated certain enumerated Texas Penal Laws two or more times during a specified period of time. A plain reading of the statute, Texas Penal Code §21.02, requires that each act must be proven to have been a violation of one of the penal laws enumerated in §21.02 at the time of its occurrence for that act to be used as one of the two or more acts required to prove Continuous Sexual Abuse. By omitting analysis of this issue, which was properly raised in Appellant's brief, the Appellate Court committed error."

01/11/2017

1. "In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, did the court of appeals err by:
   • failing to consider any reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence,
   • separating evidence about the crime scene from evidence about the relationship between Appellant and the victim as a whole,
   • speculating on evidence that was not offered by the State, and
   • speculating on a hypothesis that was inconsistent with the defendant's guilt,
   during its review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a capital allegation that Appellant committed murder while in the course of kidnapping or attempting to kidnap the victim?"
2. "In considering the 'grey area' of criminal attempt law between acts that are simply mere preparation to commit an offense and acts that tend to effect the commission of an offense, may a reviewing court reject a jury's verdict during a sufficiency of the evidence review simply because the reviewing court would have drawn the 'imaginary line' in a different location than the jury?"

12/07/2016

1. "Did the Second Court of Appeals err in misapplying the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard by holding evidence the Appellant was intoxicated, caused a wreck with a stationary occupied vehicle, and disregarded a red light was legally insufficient to support a finding the Appellant's vehicle was a deadly weapon?"
2. "Did the Second Court of Appeals err in holding that the infliction of minor injuries or "bodily injury" by the Appellant's vehicle rendered any actual danger of causing death or serious bodily injury purely hypothetical and thus insufficient to support a deadly weapon finding?"
3. "Does a deadly weapon finding in a felony driving while intoxicated conviction require a mens rea of reckless conduct?"

11/23/2016

"When the basis for trial counsel's objection to the admission of the appellant's videotaped custodial statement was apparent at trial, the reviewing court should not avoid addressing that apparent issue by holding the appellant's argument on appeal does not comport with counsel's trial objection merely because the apparent issue is more specifically articulated on appeal."

11/09/2016

State represented by SPA

1. "When the record is silent as to defense counsel's reasons for calling witnesses in support of jury-ordered probation, has the presumption of reasonable strategy been rebutted?"
2. "If the reasonableness presumption was rebutted, did defense counsel render ineffective assistance in calling witnesses who presented favorable evidence but also opened the door for damaging evidence?"

11/09/2016

State represented by SPA

1. "Is a theory of law offered to prove a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act timely presented if made for the first time in a motion for new trial?"
2. "Is a county employee who retrieves the prosecuting officer's mail its agent for service of an inmate's request for trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act?"
3. "Does a trial court abuse its discretion by failing to believe testimony or draw inferences contrary to its ruling?"

11/02/2016

1. "This ground of review assumes that a separate $5 court cost for releasing a defendant from jail is appropriate. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's assessment of a $5 cost for 'release' because the defendant was 'released' to prison. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the assessment of a cost for 'release' when the defendant was 'released' to prison?"
2. "This ground of review assumes that a $5 cost for releasing a defendant to prison is appropriate. Costs for peace officer services are to be assessed for services performed 'in the case.' The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's assessment of a $5 cost even though the sheriff released Mr. Williams to prison following trial. Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the cost assessment because the release occurred after the trial concluded?"
3. "This ground of review assumes a $5 cost for releasing a defendant to prison is appropriate even though the release occurs after trial. The Court of Appeals upheld the $5 cost's assessment even though there had been no release at the time the bill of costs was prepared. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the assessment of a cost for which a service had not yet been performed?"

11/02/2016

"Can a conviction for violating a civil commitment order be upheld when the underlying commitment order has been reversed on appeal?"

10/19/2016

Appellant's

"The court of appeals erred in finding the twenty-year, post-indictment delay was not a speedy trial violation where the State intentionally declined to bring the appellant from a prison in Nebraska because, according to office policy, filing a detainer fulfilled the State's legal duty."

State's

"If the State files a detainer under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, but neither the defendant nor the State exercise their option to force a trial in an expeditious manner, does the resulting period of delay count against the State for purposes of a speedy-trial analysis when the case finally goes to trial?"

10/19/2016

"After an informant details an ongoing criminal enterprise and leads the police to her potential co-conspirators, can a magistrate find that her tip establishes a 'fair probability' that evidence of the crime will be found where she suggests?"

10/05/2016

1. "The Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the image of a toddler with her genitals exposed, without any discernable reason for the exposure other than to arouse or offend the viewer, did not amount to a 'lewd exhibition of the genitals' for purposes of the offense of Possession of Child Pornography."
2. "Does Rosie's toddler status in 1976 when Robert Mapplethorpe photographed her revealing her genitals control the 'child younger than 18. . . when the image was made' element of possession of child pornography when, long after Rosie reached adulthood, Appellant took a 'cropped' photo of the original depicting only her genitalia?"

09/28/2016

"Is a 'deadly weapon' finding appropriate when the only thing injured or killed is a pit bull rather than a human being?"

09/28/2016

"Did the court of appeals misapply this Court's decision in Ouellette v. State in determining that the inclusion of the full statutory definition of intoxication in a jury charge constitutes harmful error?"

09/21/2016

"Whether Section 33.021 of the Texas Penal Code is a content-based restriction."

09/14/2016

"A mistrial and a new trial are largely 'functionally indistinguishable.' Here, the jury reached lawful guilty verdicts, but error tainted the punishment phase after the jury saw Appellant in shackles. Under these facts, a trial court granting a new trial must grant the new trial only as to punishment. Under the same facts, may a trial court instead order a mistrial only as to punishment?"

09/14/2016

Appellant's PDR

1."Did the Court of Appeals properly conclude that there was no rational basis for the appellant receiving disparate treatment?

2. "Should Appellant's equal protection claim be reviewed under strict scrutiny?

3. "Was it error for the Court of Appeals to affirm Appellant's sexual assault convictions as second-degree felonies and remand those charges to the trial court for a new trial on punishment, rather than order the prosecution of Appellant dismissed or remand the charges to the trial court to enter an order dismissing the prosecution?"

State's PDR

"Did the Court of Appeals properly conclude that there was no rational basis for the appellant receiving disparate treatment?"

09/14/2016

STATE'S

"Did the Eleventh Court of Appeals err by holding that convictions for criminal solicitation and attempted capital murder violate double jeopardy when significant factors indicate a legislative intent to punish these offenses as separate steps in the continuum of a criminal transaction?"

"Assuming a double jeopardy violation, who should determine what the most serious offense is? If this Court answers that question by deciding that a court of appeals should make that determination, what role should the parole consequences of Article 42.12 § 3g have in that analysis when the sentences, fine and restitution are all identical?"

APPELLANT'S

"The Court of Appeals erred when it held that parole eligibility may determine the "most serious" offense for purposes of double jeopardy."
 "What is the proper remedy for multiple punishment when the 'most serious' offense cannot be determined?"

09/14/2016

State represented by SPA

"The Waco Court of Appeals erred in holding, without formal charges, an accomplice witness can only be classified as a matter of fact and cannot be an accomplice as a matter of law."

09/14/2016

State represented by SPA

"Was Appellee entitled to a new trial, as both lower courts held, when she waived the right to seek a new trial and presented no valid legal claim supported by new evidence not previously available or discoverable with due diligence?"

08/24/2016

"The court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's denial of the lesser-included jury charge of deadly conduct in the trial for aggravated assault on a public servant."

08/24/2016

"Whether the Fourth Court of Appeals erred by failing to recognize and apply the analysis of the United States Supreme Court and this Court's past rulings under the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Article 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution regarding the unconstitutionality of Texas Penal Code Section 33.021."

07/27/2016

"Did the court of appeals err in holding that the savings clause of S.B. 746 violated the separation of power clause of the Texas Constitution so even though Appellant's appeal was pending when the Texas legislature amended chapter 841 Health & Safety Code to decriminalize the conduct for which Appellant was convicted, and since the amendments would have applied to Appellant since his conviction was not final when the amendments went into effect but for the savings clause being declared unconstitutional Appellant conviction should not have been reversed."

07/27/2016

State represented by SPA

"Does the submission of an instruction on transferred intent entitle a defendant to an instruction on mistake of fact even if the greater offense does not have any additional culpable mental state and there is no evidence that the defendant harbored a mistaken belief?"

06/29/2016

1. "Did the State of Texas properly preserve error for lack of notice of a pre-trial hearing pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 28.01 when in truth they objected merely to the evidentiary character of a pre-trial hearing on a Motion to Suppress?"
2. "Did the court of appeals err in concluding that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 28.01 requires the Trial Court to provide additional notice to the State of the potential for a pre-trial hearing on a properly filed and served Motion to Suppress beyond an order to appear ready for trial on a certain date?"

06/22/2016

State represented by SPA

"Is fire a deadly weapon when Good-Samaritan neighbors and firefighters were in the "zone of danger" and had to take 'evasive action' to contain and extinguish nearby flaming vegetation and a burning house emitting 'extremely toxic' fumes?"

06/08/2016

1. "The majority of the court of appeals erred in holding that Appellant failed to preserve error in the exclusion of evidence of Diles's prior convictions, his physical abuse of Castillo, and his gang membership."
2. "The majority of the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Diles's physical abuse of Castillo, and Diles's gang membership to show that he was the first aggressor, to show the reasonableness of Appellant's apprehension of danger, and to show that Appellant acted in self-defense."
3. "The majority of the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Diles's physical abuse of Castillo after the State opened up the door to its admission."

05/25/2016

State represented by SPA

"What is the proper remedy when the defendant and the State 'charge bargain' for an open plea of guilty to a lesser-included offense and the trial judge imposes an illegal sentence?"

05/25/2016

State represented by SPA

1. "Is failing to maintain a safe speed and keep a proper distance the sort of 'unexplained failure' that this Court suggested in Tello v. State, 180 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), would be unworthy of criminal sanction?"
2. "Did the court of appeals ignore basic rules of sufficiency review when it disregarded evidence that supported the verdict and drew inferences contrary to those presumably drawn by the jury?"

05/25/2016

"Did the court of appeals properly apply either prong of Strickland v. Washington when it affirmed a new trial based on defense counsel's allegedly deficient advice to proceed with an 11-member jury?"

05/25/2016

1. "Did the court of appeals err in finding that Respondent admitted to threatening his victim, and thereby admitted to committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, by testifying he held a gun at his side with the barrel pointed at the ground?"
2. "Did the court of appeals err by relying on law not applicable to this case in order to reach its holding?"
3. "Did the court of appeals err when it cited a case as support of an application of law that the case actually held to be error?"

05/18/2016

1. "The court of appeals erred in treating the trial court's refusal to allow final argument before revoking Appellant's community supervision as structural error immune from a harmless-error analysis."
2. "The court of appeals' treatment of the trial court's refusal to allow final argument before revoking Appellant's community supervision as structural error immune from a harmless-error analysis is contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this Court defining what constitutes structural error."

05/04/2016

"Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that unanimity is not required with respect to the enumerated offenses of theft and money laundering in an engaging in organized criminal activity by commission jury charge."

04/27/2016

1. "The court of appeals erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that petitioner 'trafficked' the alleged victim as intended by the statute."
2. "The court of appeals erred in finding that the application of the plain language of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 20A.01(4) did not lead to an absurd consequence that the legislature could not have intended."

04/27/2016

"The Court of Appeals' decision that the consolidated court cost was constitutional failed to explain how the comprehensive rehabilitation fee is a legitimate criminal justice purpose."

04/27/2016

"When a statute, Sec. 22.0[1]1(f), Tex. Penal Code Ann. (2011)(sexual assault), creates an element of the offense by citing specifically to another penal statute, Sec. 25.01, Tex. Penal Code Ann. (2001) (bigamy), is it proper to ignore the cited statute and permit conviction based on wholly unrelated non-penal statute, i.e., Sec. 6.201, Texas Family Code (2014) (consanguinity)?"

04/13/2016

"The Court of Appeals erred in failing to properly review the evidence and determine whether there was at least a 51% chance that appellant would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been available during trial."

03/12/2016

1. "What is the correct definition of the phrase 'communicating . . . in a . . . harassing manner' as used in the statute for protective orders in family violence cases, and, as applied in this case, did it penalize protected speech in violation of Petitioner's First Amendment rights? [Tex. Pen. Code § 25.07(A)(1)(A)]"
2. "Whether this is a 'content-based' First Amendment case and ought to have been decided by a different standard of review, 'strict scrutiny' as enunciated in the case of Ex parte Lo."
3. "If strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review, whether the correct standard of review can be waived."

03/09/2016

1. "Upon analyzing the applicability of the equitable doctrine of laches, this Court has established a framework for review under the totality of the circumstances. The court of appeals erred when it did not faithfully apply this framework and, instead, diminished the importance of faded memories and wholly failed to consider appellant's reason for delaying more than seven years in bringing his claim."
2. "The court of appeals granted relief for ineffective assistance of counsel because the trial attorney did not investigate the specific stats regarding the detaining officer's overtime pay for impeachment purposes, which it considered a local defense custom. The court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court by ignoring evidence that investigation of this specific officer was not so pervasive as to be a professional standard, failed to actually consider whether such evidence would be admissible, and overlooked that its argument against prejudice on the State's laches claim should preclude prejudice in appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim."

03/02/2016

1. "Is it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to rely on a driver's implied consent to a blood draw when the driver was involved in an accident, there is probable cause to believe he is intoxicated, and where the driver's own unconsciousness prevents the officer from effectively obtaining the driver's actual consent?"
2. "Were there sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless blood draw where (1) the officers were occupied with the accident investigation, (2) the defendant had fled the scene and remained unidentified for some time, and (3) where there were few officers or magistrates on hand to expeditiously obtain a warrant?"

03/02/2016

"By ruling that Anna Knelsen's sworn writ allegations did not constitute a sufficient basis for vacating her conviction, even though the record conclusively establishes that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made and that it resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals has rendered a decision which conflicts with applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court."

03/02/2016

1. "Whether the Court of Appeals gave proper deference to the trial court's determination of factual issues and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility or demeanor?"
2. "Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that the police officer's stop did not qualify under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement?"
3. "Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant's vehicle?"

03/02/2016

"Where the evidence may support a conviction either for theft or the lesser-included offense of attempted theft, did the trial court err in denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense?"

02/24/2016

1. "Should a court of appeals consider all of the totality of the circumstances, including (a) who initially searched a dorm room, (b) whether law enforcement had to conduct any additional search beyond a search conducted by university officials, and (c) whether a student consented to university officials searching her room, when determining whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by law enforcement's actions in entering a dorm room?"
2. "Should a university's duty to provide a safe environment, with an atmosphere conducive to the educational process, and the minimal intrusion by law enforcement be balanced against a college student's Fourth Amendment rights when determining the reasonableness of a dorm room search?"
3. "The Court of Appeals erred in categorically ruling that the plain view doctrine did not apply because university administrators cannot have actual or apparent authority to consent to law enforcement's entry into a dormitory room."

02/24/2016

"Did the court of appeals err in its assessment of probable cause for a warrantless arrest pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.01?"

02/03/2016

"Did the Court of Appeals err when it 'utilize[d] Fourth Amendment precedent' in determining Art. 1 Section 9 of the Texas Constitution was not violated when the State obtained Appellant's cell phone records without a warrant in light of Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)?"

02/03/2016

"The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the felony offense of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements since the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant intentionally or knowingly failed to comply with the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program, as charged in the indictment. The Court of Appeals reliance on Robinson v. State, No. PD-0421-14, 2015 WL 4068109 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2015), is in error since the indictment required the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant intentionally or knowingly failed to provide his anticipated move date and new address."

01/27/2016

1. "The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the audio recording of Mayra's custodial interrogation was admissible notwithstanding the fact that the recording device used was not capable of making an accurate recording."
2. "The Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard in holding that the recording equipment's failure to record twenty minutes of Mayra's custodial interrogation did not amount to an alteration that rendered the recording unreliable and untrustworthy."
3. "The Court of Appeals misapplied this Court's holding in Weatherred because the audio tape failed to meet the requirements of section three of art. 38.22 and the trial court knew that before its ruling to allow the audio recording into evidence."

01/13/2016

State represented by SPA

1. "Is there a common-law 'fundamental error' exception to preservation that exists outside of the framework of Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)?"
2. "Is a complaint about a judge's comment on the evidence forfeited if not raised at trial?"
3. "The trial judge's exchange with a witness neither tainted the defendant's presumption of innocence nor vitiated the jury's impartiality, and it was harmless under any standard."

01/13/2016

"Did the Court of Appeals err by finding that trial counsel's deficient performance regarding Appellant's probation eligibility, which Appellant relied upon in waiving his constitutional right to a jury trial, was not prejudicial under Strickland?"

01/13/2016

1. "The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and may not be waived without the client's consent. Appellant expressly waived attorney-client privilege but limited the waiver to one extraneous offense. Trial counsel questioned Appellant's previous counsel regarding privileged communications concerning a second extraneous offense without Appellant's consent."
2. "Did the Court of Appeals err in determining trial counsel's disclosure was not ineffective assistance of counsel but instead an 'implied waiver?'"
3. "Does implied waiver under the 'offensive use' doctrine apply to the general defense of reasonable excuse provided for in Tex. Pen. Code § 38.10?"
4. "Can implied waiver under Tex. R. Evid. 511 trump Appellant's expressed and specific limitation on the waiver of her attorney-client privilege?"
5. "Did the Court of Appeals improperly shift the burden to Appellant to prove she did not waive her attorney-client privilege?"

11/04/2015

State represented by SPA

1. "Does Penal Code section 16.02 prohibit intercepting and disclosing the contents of an oral communication even when the speaker has no expectation that his words will not be repeated by those present?"
2. "Does a basketball coach have a justifiable expectation that his pep talk in a girls' locker room will not be secretly recorded by a former player?"

09/16/2015

"The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed Appellant's appeal for want of jurisdiction because: (1) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 44.02 allows appeals from a criminal action, and under this Court's holding in Bautsch v. Galveston, 11 S.W. 414 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889), a hearing on a motion for shock probation is a criminal action; and (2) the issue appealed was an unconstitutional imposition of restitution, and not the granting of shock probation itself."

09/16/2015

1. "The Court of Appeals Erred in Failing to Affirm the Trial Court's Ruling Denying Appellant's Request for a Section 8.03 Mistake of Law Instruction."
2. "The Court of Appeals Erred in Finding that Appellant Was Harmed by the Trial Court's Failure to Provide a Section 8.03 Mistake of Law Instruction."