Pending PDR Cases

6/25/26

State’s Grounds

1. “Did Eaton’s objection preserve error under Rule 403 or under Due Process?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err by concluding that the trial court should be reversed because of a single question that violated Crawford and because the trial court admitted a six second video of Eaton in restraints?”

On the Court’s Own Motion

“Whether the court of appeals erred by failing to afford appropriate deference to the trial court on the admissibility of the evidence.” 

6/25/26

“The Thirteenth Court of Appeals opinion has erroneously expanded First Amendment rights of the public to transparency in law enforcement conduct, to include a right to eavesdrop and surreptitiously record conversations intended by officers to be private, and made during ongoing investigations.”

6/25/26

State’s Grounds

1. “Where the original indictment alleging Appellant Attempted to Murder his girlfriend by ‘hitting her and holding her underwater’ put him on notice that he might have to defend against Family Violence Assault based on Appellant’s ‘hitting her and holding her underwater,’ did the Third Court err in failing to recognize the original indictment tolled the statute of limitations for the latter charges—which were based on the exact same underlying conduct?”
2. “Should this Court grant the petition for review and reverse, or alternatively, summarily reverse the Third Court’s Johnson opinion and remand for the Third Court to apply and follow this Court’s decision in Hernandez, Marks, and West?”

On the Court’s Own Motion

“Whether the Court’s opinions in Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768  (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), Marks v. State, 560 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), and/or State v. West, 632 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), should be reconsidered.” 

6/11/2026

1. “The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of the indictments for the State’s failure to produce evidence to buttress the presumption of regularity, and wrongly treated such as a jurisdictional defect.”
2. “Does Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.30 operate to prevent the dismissal of a case where a re-transfer to the district court would be the proper remedy to cure any alleged transfer defects?”

6/11/2026

1. “The court of appeals erred in affirming the dismissals of fifty-nine misdemeanor indictments by the trial court because: 
   1) the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s long established case law that holds that a court document is deemed filed when it is placed in the custody or control of the clerk and, once in the clerk’s custody or control, a party like the State is not responsible for and cannot be prejudiced by any errors or omissions of the court clerk; 
   2) no law or rule of procedure requires that grand jury indictments for misdemeanor offenses, as expressly permitted by the Texas Constitution, must first be filed in a district court, being a court without competent jurisdiction, before the indictment can be transferred and filed in a county court, a court of appropriate jurisdiction; 
   3) no law or rule of procedure requires that documents tendered to a court clerk for filing be physically affixed together by staples or other means; and 
   4) any transfer defects that exist are procedural and non-jurisdictional in nature pursuant to the 1985 constitutional and statutory amendments rejecting a hyper-technical approach to measure the validity of indictments.”
2. “Does Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.30 operate to prevent the dismissal of a case where a re-transfer to the grand-jury district court would be the proper remedy to cure any alleged transfer defects?”

6/4/2026

1. “The appellate court misconstrued the statutory mens rea requirement by applying the incorrect standard to the specific charge and, subsequently, erred in permitting a finding of knowledge without proof that Appellant was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result in Texas.”  
2. “The Court of Appeals’ determination that Texas possessed territorial jurisdiction conflicts with prior appellate court decisions that the court itself acknowledged as instructive yet failed to follow in reaching its holding.”

6/4/26

“The court of appeals’ rationale for rejecting Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in discharging his second-chair attorney and appointed a new one over his  objection fails to properly apply the relevant caselaw.” 

5/21/26

1. “Did the Court of Appeals err by overturning the trial court’s conclusion that the search warrant affidavit was legally unsworn, and the search warrant of Appellee’s phone was facially defective pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.0215(c) such that the good-faith exception of Article 38.23(b) did not apply to this case?”
2. “If a good-faith exception analysis is required, did the Court of Appeals err by extending that exception to a case where the two law enforcement officers and the signing judge were unaware of a ten-year old statute that contained mandatory language reflecting an elevated concern for privacy rights for the issuance of a search warrant for an electronic communications device?”

5/21/26

1. “The court of appeals erred in holding that Appellant inadequately briefed his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered or newly available evidence from Joe Ramirez, the only independent eyewitness who corroborated his justification defense, thereby misapplying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) and avoiding the merits of a preserved constitutional and statutory claim under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 40.001 and Carsner.”
2. “The court of appeals erred in holding that Juror 43 was disabled from sitting under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.29(b) based solely on prospective work and vacation conflicts created by a defense continuance to secure a material justification witness, thereby expanding the concept of disability beyond thi Court’s precedents and undermining the defendant’s interest in continuity of the sworn jury after jeopardy has attached.”
3. “The court of appeals erred in holding that the State’s repeated interpretive narration of multi-angle video evidence through slow motion, frame-by-frame playback and law enforcement commentary on who was attacking, who was defensive, and whose movements were stabbing was either unpreserved or harmless, thereby diluting the limits on lay opinion under Rules 401, 403, and 701 in modern video driven self-defense and defense-of-others trials.”

5/21/26

1. “The court of appeals erred in reviewing this case solely as a due process matter, when this Court holds that the failure of a trial court to provide a defendant a trial in a language he can speak and comprehend is a Sixth Amendment issue.”
2. “Even if the trial court’s decision is reviewed solely for an abuse of discretion, the court of appeals erred in how it applied that standard to the record in this case.”

05/07/2026

“Is the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in O’Brien v. State applicable to EOCA when a person is charged as being a member of a criminal street gang rather than being part of a combination?”  

5/7/26

“Does a federal law enforcement agent ‘lawfully discharge an official duty’ while making a state law misdemeanor arrest when Texas law allows a federal agent to make only state law felony arrests?”

5/7/26

On Court’s Own Motion

1. “Did the court of appeals err to conclude that having ten regular jurors and two alternate jurors participate in the deliberation of Appellant’s guilt or innocence, when all twelve regular jurors were present and able and apparently willing to participate in deliberations, did not violate Article V, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution?”
2. “Did the court of appeals err to conclude that any error in having two alternate jurors inside the jury room and actively participating in deliberations, in violation of Article 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, was harmless under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure?”

4/30/26

State represented by SPA

1. “After providing a full opportunity for voir dire, does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit a party to individually re-question veniremembers whose qualifications are ambiguous only because of the party’s own questions?” 
2. “Is a juror subject to a challenge for cause if he indicates that he would either ‘always or almost always’ believe that officers are more truthful than other witnesses?”

4/30/26

1. “When a defendant has knowingly and competently invoked his right to self-representation, may a trial court terminate that right based on questioning it deems irrelevant or repetitive, without explicit findings of deliberate obstructionist misconduct?  May an appellate court affirm such termination by applying ‘almost total deference’?”
2. “When a trial court revokes a defendant’s right to self representation mid-trial and forces unprepared standby counsel to take over against the defendant’s wishes, can the court deny a continuance, violating the defendant’s due process rights and leaving the defendant with neither autonomy nor effective assistance of counsel?”

4/16/26

On the Court’s own motion

“Did the court of appeals err in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant’s objection to testimony that ‘[t]hese children were believable’?”

4/9/26

“Did the court of appeals incorrectly dismiss Petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, when Petitioner attempted to timely file his new trial motion on July 11, 2025, which was rejected by the county clerk’s office because of a formatting error when a deputy clerk misinterpreted the e-filing rules, causing this motion to be file-marked with an untimely date, instead of the timely earlier attempted filing date?"

04/02/2026

1. “Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the cashier’s check
   purported to be the act of an entity called ‘PacPhil Bank.’”
2. “One of the essential elements of forgery is that the writing purports to be the act of another who did not authorize the act. Does the statutory definition of ‘another’ require the person to be a real individual or entity?”
3. “Whether a cashier’s check embodying the purported act of a fictitious entity isvoid on its face and, therefore, not a forgery.”
4. “Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the exclusion of the statutory
   definition of ‘another’ and the accompanying pertinent statutory definitions of ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ ‘corporation,’ and ‘association’ from the jury charge did not egregiously harm Petitioner when those definitions were critical to the jury’s determination of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s act purported to be the act of another.”

4/2/26

1. “Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the cashier’s check purported to be the act of an entity called ‘PacPhil Bank.’”
2. “One of the essential elements of forgery is that the writing purports to be the act of another who did not authorize the act.  Does the statutory definition of ‘another’ require the person to be a real individual or entity?”
3. “Whether a cashier’s check embodying the purported act of a fictitious entity is void on its face and, therefore, not a forgery.”
4. “Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the exclusion of the statutory definition of ‘another’ and the accompanying pertinent  statutory definitions of ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ ‘corporation,’ and ‘association’ from the jury charge did not egregiously harm Petitioner when those definitions were critical to the jury’s determination of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s act purported to be the act of another.”

04/02/2026

State represented by SPA

1. "Should State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), be overruled and ‘state’ in the discovery statute be interpreted to mean the prosecutor’s office?"
2. "Should State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), be overruled and ‘state’ be interpreted to mean ‘the prosecution’—i.e., those that participate in the investigation or prosecution of the offense?" 

3/5/26

State represented by SPA

1. “Does submission of an instruction on provoking the difficulty, Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(b)(4), require evidence that the difficulty was a scheme to manufacture a claim of self-defense?”
2. “If so, should the jury be given non-statutory instructions on the pretextual nature of the provocation?”

2/26/26

Appellant’s Ground 
“Does a search warrant affidavit provide probable cause to obtain the contents of Appellant’s cell phone when the facts relied on to establish a nexus between the phone and a crime under investigation consist of an anonymous, unverified tip?” 

On the Court’s Own Motion
“Does the search warrant affidavit in Appellant’s case establish a nexus between the cell phone and the criminal activity under investigation under State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)?”

1/29/26

State represented by SPA

Appellant’s Ground
“Should the inquiry for motive to testify for the State be limited to the existence of criminal proceedings against a witness?”

On the Court’s Own Motion
“Should the Court reconsider or clarify any aspect of its decision in Irby v. State, 32[7] S.W.3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)?”

1/29/26

State represented by SPA

On the Court's Own Motion

“Should the Court reconsider or clarify any aspect of its decision in Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)?

1/29/26

1. “The Court of Appeals Erred by Bypassing All of the Procedural Bars Raised by the State Without Explanation or Valid Legal Justification.”
2. “The Court of Appeals Erred by Granting Relief on a Claim that Wasn’t Raised and Was Without Merit.”

1/22/26

Appellant’s Ground

Did the Court of Appeals err by treating Wells as binding authority rather than a hodgepodge of conflicting opinions with no controlling majority?

State’s Ground

“If this Court grants review of Defendant-Appellant’s petition, before even reaching any advisory Wells issues, should it first recognize that the third-party doctrine independently supports affirming Appellant’s judgment?”

1/22/26

State represented by SPA

“Did the appellate court err by applying the heightened ‘directly-rebut-or-truly negate’ requirement for mental disease evidence to the defendant’s brothers’ testimony, which consisted of observational evidence of his tendency to think a certain way and his behavioral characteristics and background evidence supporting his defense?”

1/15/26

State represented by SPA

“Contrary to the court of appeals’s holding, review of the videos shows appellant’s consent to search was voluntary and nothing like the oppressive 4-on-1 situation described in Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).”

1/11/25

1. “When assessing a probable-cause nexus, should Texas adopt the distinction in Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 148 N.E.3d 361 (Mass. 2020) (cert. denied), between (1) stranger-on-stranger crimes (like State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)) and (2) household-violence homicides where affidavits describe fraught relationships and where devices found in the same home as the relationships and crimes will likely reveal a ‘clear window into the nature’ of those relationships and thus the offense (like here)?”
2. “Given the trial court’s finding that officers relied on the warrant in good faith, the evidence was admissible under the Fourth Amendment and excludable— if at all—only under Texas’s statutory rule. Did the court of appeals violate Holder v. State, 639 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (disavowing Love), by applying the constitutional-error harm standard of rule 44.2(a)?”
3. “Did the court of appeals violate Long v. State, 203 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), by reversing a conviction for evidentiary error without engaging with the remaining evidence beyond a bald statement that ‘other evidence’ existed? Further, given that the unaddressed evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction, was the error harmless under any standard?”

11/20/25

1. “Can two extraneous shootings be admitted in a murder trial as same-transaction contextual evidence, when the undisputed testimony from an accomplice proved they were unrelated to the charged offense?”
2. “Can those same shootings be admitted to rebut a ‘defensive theory’ that was raised by the State?”
3. “Does an appellate court err in holding that evidence of extraneous shootings is more probative than prejudicial because it tends to prove the defendant acted in conformity with that evidence?”
4. “Can photographs and Instagram posts related to firearms be admitted in a murder trial when that evidence either is not related to the offense, or is not related to the defendant?”

10/30/25

State represented by SPA

“When an appellant makes multiple arguments against a trial court’s ruling and pursues only one on appeal, can the court of appeals properly ignore that argument, assume the trial court was right about an abandoned argument, and affirm?”

10/30/25

“Is a point of error on direct appeal of a criminal case waived if harm is not briefed?” 

10/16/25

1. “In holding that a defendant can be ‘convicted of illegal weapon possession and simultaneously subject to a deadly weapon finding’ in the absence of a collateral felony to which the finding could attach, the Seventh Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with those of its sister courts; thus, necessitating a review by this Court to resolve the issue.”
2. “The Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the propriety of the trial court’s inclusion in the judgment against Respondent of a deadly weapon finding when there was no associated felony to which that finding could be attached conflicts with this Court’s decision in Plummer v. State, and, thus, should be reviewed by the Court.”

9/24/25

1. “Since the appeal was abated, can this Court review the decision below, or is it effectively prevented from ever reviewing the statutory issue?

   Was any error jurisdictional requiring abatement? 

   If abatement was required, was the decision interlocutory? 

2. Under Article 42.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does “presence” mean physical presence in the courtroom or is videoconference allowed?
3. Assuming error, is a defendant harmed simply because he heard his sentence over videoconference rather than in person?
4. Assuming harmful error, is an entirely new sentencing hearing required when Article 42.03 only instructs that the sentence be pronounced in the defendant’s presence?”

7/30/25

1. “Does testimony of a narrowly limited portion of an interview mislead jurors and necessitate the admission of more of the interview to answer broader, unasked questions under Rule 107?” 
2. “What standard for harm should be used when evaluating error regarding admissibility of evidence?” 

7/2/25

“The Court of Appeals erred by approving the trial court’s decision to allow the State to use illegally obtained evidence through its insanity expert because: (1) McDonald’s  objection to the testimony and behavior of the State’s insanity expert was properly preserved and presented on appeal; and (2) the constitutional harm of the testimony was proven. (Issue 6)”

5/28/25

State represented by SPA

1. “Should Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), be overruled to the extent it holds that failing to limit the mental state definitions to the right conduct-element is error even when the jury charge otherwise leaves no doubt what the mental state requires?”
2. “Should failure to limit the abstract definition result in some harm in the absence of anyone telling jurors they could convict on something less than the offense requires?”  

5/21/25

“Did the Court of Appeals err[] in holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of JG’s prior sexual assault allegations that resulted in her sister getting to live with her grandmother?”

4/9/25

State represented by SPA

1. “What role, if any, do a defendant’s personal experiences play in the determination of whether his perception of imminent harm under Tex. Penal Code § 9.22(1) is reasonable?”
2. “Are the reasonableness of both a defendant’s perception of necessity and his response wholly within the discretion of the jury, or can a court decide either is unreasonable as a matter of law?” 
3. “Must a harm analysis for charge error consider the likelihood that the outcome would have been different had the jury been properly instructed?”
4. “Was appellant entitled to an instruction on necessity and, if so, a new trial?”

2/26/25

State represented by SPA

1. “Does ‘inducing a child to engage in sexual conduct’ for purposes of sexual performance by a child require the child’s consent or some measurable degree of participation?”  
2. “If the evidence was insufficient to prove the completed offense, did the court of appeals properly state and apply the standard for reformation to attempted sexual performance by a child?” 

01/29/2025

1. “The lower court’s opinion arguing that the plain-view doctrine is equivalent to standing and can be raised for the first time on appeal creates a split amongst the appellate courts that must be resolved by this Court. State v. Elrod, 395 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013)[.]”
2. “Is the plain-view doctrine equivalent to a standing issue that falls within the waiver exception, allowing the State to raise it for the first time on appeal?”
3. “Did the appellate court afford the trial court proper deference in overturning its order based on a legal theory the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on?”
4. “Did the appellate court erroneously apply the plain-view doctrine?”
5. “Did the appellate court erroneously apply the independent source doctrine?”
6. “Did the appellate court err in overruling the trial court’s finding that the arrest warrant for possession was not supported by probable cause?”
7. “Did the appellate court err in finding the trial court owed the magistrate’s finding deference where the warrant affidavit was based on illegally obtained information?”

1/29/25

“A majority of the court of appeals erred in finding that the lead detective was not reasonable in believing that Appellee’s mother had apparent authority to consent to the search of her apartment, including Appellee’s bedroom.”

1/22/25

State represented by SPA

1. “Can a court determine that the State’s use of immunized testimony violated Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), without knowing the substance of that immunized testimony?”
2. “What is the proper framework to use for presentation and review of a Kastigar claim, including invocation, burden of proof, harm analysis, and remedy?”

1/22/25

“Did the court of appeals error in holding that must apply a mechanical, strict requirement that inventory searches ‘must not deviate’ in any detail from department policy?”

8/21/24

“Did the appellate court misapply the legal sufficiency standard of review by:

• crediting Appellant’s self-serving testimony which the trial court reasonably could have disregarded; and/or
• resolving an ambiguity in Appellant’s testimony in Appellant’s favor; and/or
• reweighing evidence in favor of the defense; and/or
• ignoring evidence that supported the verdict; and/or
• applying sufficiency analyses long rejected by this Court; and/or
• failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict[?]”

8/21/24

“The Second Court of Appeals decided an important question of federal law that is not settled by the Court of Criminal appeals when it held that Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right was not violated by having a virtual hearing on a motion to adjudicate guilt and subsequent sentencing hearing despite his request to be physically present before and during the proceedings.”