Neuser, Nathaniel

4/30/26

PDNUM

State represented by SPA

  1. “After providing a full opportunity for voir dire, does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit a party to individually re-question veniremembers whose qualifications are ambiguous only because of the party’s own questions?” 
  2. “Is a juror subject to a challenge for cause if he indicates that he would either ‘always or almost always’ believe that officers are more truthful than other witnesses?”

Neuser was tried for child sex offenses and injury to a child.  After the general voir dire proceedings concluded, Neuser’s defense counsel asked the trial court to conduct call-back individual voir dire of prospective jurors who indicated that: (1) they couldn’t foresee a set of circumstances in which the lower end of punishment would be appropriate for injury to a child, and (2) they would “always or almost always” believe the police over other witnesses.  The trial court ruled that the additional inquiries were improper.    The judge observed that counsel used the phrase “can you foresee something being an appropriate punishment.” And the judge added, “Almost always isn’t always.”  The trial court denied counsel’s for-cause challenges.  The jury convicted Neuser.

The court of appeals reversed. It held that Neuser was improperly denied further individual questioning of veniremembers who couldn’t think of a situation in which giving the minimum punishment for injury to a child would be appropriate.  In doing so, it faulted the trial court for being arbitrary with its call-backs because it called back jurors who indicated they could not “give meaningful consideration” to one end of the range over another in response to the prosecutor’s questioning.  It also held that the trial court erred by denying Neuser’s for-cause challenges to jurors who “always or almost always” believed law enforcement to be more truthful. 

First, the State challenges the lower court’s determination of arbitrariness.  It points out that the trial court acted within its discretion when it treated the defense’s injury-range questions differently from the other range questions, because subtle distinctions in how the questions were phrased—and the vocal emphasis that only the trial court could hear firsthand—gave the judge a reasonable basis for finding the injury-range answers ambiguous. 

Next, the State contends that the trial court had discretion to call back only jurors who made clear, unequivocal statements of bias; it wasn’t required to call back everyone a party wanted to question further. Here, the defense had a full opportunity during voir dire to clearly establish juror bias but failed to do so, and requiring the trial court to allow additional questioning whenever answers are ambiguous would enable endless voir dire and improperly excuse a party’s own failure to ask the right questions the first time.

Finally, the State argues that jurors who said they would “always or almost always” believe a police officer are not challengeable for cause because expressing something less than absolute belief means a juror is still open to persuasion.