Pitts-Marshall, Demontre Jaleel

Pitts-Marshall drove himself and a friend into the parking lot of a building that, unbeknownst to him, housed a joint task force of federal and state law enforcement.  Two ICE officers noticed and were nearby when Pitts-Marshall’s passenger smashed the driver’s side window of an unoccupied truck.  The officers unholstered their weapons and announced their presence.  As one of the officers attempted to pull the passenger out of Pitts-Marshall’s car, Pitts-Marshall shifted into reverse and ran over the officer’s foot.  Pitts-Marshall was charged and convicted of aggravated assault on a public servant.

At oral argument on appeal, Pitts-Marshall argued that the ICE officer was not “lawfully discharging an official duty” when he assaulted him, as required by the offense.  See Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(b)(2)(B).  They have arrest authority over felonies, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2A.002(a)(3), but the only offenses Pitts-Marshall says he could have been committing were misdemeanors like burglary of a motor vehicle.  The State countered that the officers could have suspected unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a state-jail felony, and should be encouraged to intervene to find out which (and prevent both).  The court of appeals held simply that, “At the time of the arrest, appellant had already used his vehicle—a deadly weapon—in the commission of an assault, thereby completing an aggravated assault, which is a felony offense.”

Pitts-Marshall repeats his belated argument in the Court of Criminal Appeals.  He says the officer’s authority to arrest him for aggravated assault after his foot was run over is a separate question from whether the officer had authority to arrest him when his foot was run over.