PD-0409-22 09/04/2024
Does TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1) have an exigency requirement for warrantless arrests?
Armstrong moved to suppress blood test results, arguing that his warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicated was not supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances as required by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03. The trial court denied the motion, and Armstrong pleaded guilty.
Relying on State v. McGuire, 586 S.W.3d 451, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019), reversed on other grounds in State v. McGuire, 689 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Armstrong’s motion to suppress. The McGuire court of appeals decision determined that Article 14.03(a)(1) has an exigency requirement that the State has the burden to satisfy. Here, the court of appeals concluded that the State made no exigency argument before the trial court; thus, it did not satisfy its burden.
The State argues that the text of Article 14.03(a)(1) does not have an exigency requirement. It points out that neither the U.S. nor the Texas constitutions demand a warrant to conduct an arrest in public. Next, the State contends that contrary case law—Gallups and Swain—was erroneously developed. The State explains that Gallups and Swain relied on Judge Cochran’s concurring opinion in Dyar v. State, which in turn discussed Professor Reamey’s concern that Article 14.03(a)(1) could, in practice, result in an unfettered crime-scene warrant exception. 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (Cochran, J., concurring); Gerald S. Reamey, Arrests in Texas’s “Suspicious Places”: A Rule in Search of Reason, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 931 (2000). Professor Reamey proposed that an exigency requirement be applied to Article 14.03(a)(1)’s requirement that an arrest be made in a “suspicious place.” The State contends that Judge Cochran’s Dyar concurrence offered only a suggestion; it was not an accurate statement of law, particularly since there is no constitutional warrant requirement. When later cited in Gallups and Swain, the State argues, the Court erroneously restated dicta. Further, neither case announced a new exigency rule.