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Barrera, Greg Anthony, III

01/29/2026

Appellant’s Ground
“Should the inquiry for motive to testify for the State be limited to the existence of criminal proceedings against a witness?”

On The Court’s Own Motion
“Should the Court reconsider or clarify any aspect of its decision in Irby v. State, 32[7] S.W.3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)?”

Rojero was one of several friends in a car with Barrera when Barrera shot another person outside a hip-hop event. The State called Rojero as a witness at Barrera’s murder trial. Rojero had been indicted for theft of a firearm in an apparently unconnected case and, two months after the murder, was placed on deferred adjudication. But Rojero had not been promised anything by the State nor had he been threatened. The trial court denied Barrera’s request to cross-examine Rojero about the case.

Following his murder conviction, Barrera appealed the limitation on his right of cross-examination. Citing Irby, the court of appeals explained that (1) a defendant has the burden to establish a “causal connection” or “logical relationship” between the matter sought to be elicited on cross and a defensive theory, and (2) a witness’s probationary status doesn’t itself constitute a connection because that bare fact doesn’t invariably create bias or motive to curry favor with the State. Because Rojero’s probationary status was all the evidence Barrera offered, the court of appeals denied his claim.

Barrera argues that Irby should not control. He contends that Rojero’s theft-of-a-firearm offense was relevant because the murder involved a firearm, the defense pursued an alternative perpetrator theory, and no firearm was ever recovered. He contends Rojero’s motive to deflect any blame for the murder makes this case more like Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), which held that evidence of the victim’s misconduct should have been admitted where there were no concerns of harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, or repetitive interrogation. Citing federal cases, he argues that it is always permissible to expose a witness’s bias.