Crumely, John Paul

Crumley exchanged texts and messages over the course of days with “Alyssa TX 13,” a forum user who purported to be a 13-year-old girl.  This culminated in “Alyssa” agreeing to have sex with Crumley.  Crumley was arrested when he showed up at the agreed meeting place.  “Alyssa” turned out to be a male investigator with a child exploitation unit.  Crumley was convicted of online solicitation of a minor.  His defense was that he knew the whole time that “Alyssa” was an adult, probably a male.  Crumley testified and explained that he had difficulty with peer-to-peer social interactions, an inability to read social cues, and an overall diminished ability to deal with people.  He said this is how he got “catfished” twice by women online.  So, Crumley testified, he set out to expose someone he thought was lying.  

In support, the defense offered expert testimony that Crumley was diagnosed with “Autism Spectrum Disorder level 1 without intellectual impairment.”  Level 1 is the lowest of three levels in terms of severity; Crumley exhibited no evidence of decline in intellectual functioning or impairment of his impulse control but had a clear lack of social cognition, i.e., social skills, difficulty understanding other people’s perspectives (“theory of mind”), and exhibits “rigid thinking,” which is difficulty shifting off of repetitive thoughts or behaviors.  His brothers would have testified that appellant had been catfished.  They also would have said he generally had problems interacting with people and taking social cues, and that once he made up his mind “he stayed on that track.”  The trial court did not admit this evidence.

The court of appeals reversed but the State’s petition for review was granted.  The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible under Ruffin v. State, which reaffirmed that there are no “diminished capacity” defenses other than insanity and held that evidence of a “mental disease or defect” can be excluded “if it does not truly negate the required mens rea.”  270 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).  It remanded for consideration of the admissibility of the brothers’ testimony apart from the expert testimony.

The court of appeals affirmed on remand.  It viewed the brothers’ testimony as substantively the same as the mental-disease evidence rejected by the CCA and so “[could not] conclude the [CCA] would consider the proffered testimony of appellant’s brothers to do more than provide context for the offense or otherwise explain decisions collateral to the formation of appellant’s mental state.”

Crumley complains that the court of appeals wrongly characterized his brothers’ testimony and that this resulted in it applying a test he should not have to satisfy.  He claims that his brothers’ testimony is not “mental-disease evidence” but observational evidence, and that the “directly rebuts or truly negates” standard reaffirmed on original submission does not apply.  Because their testimony would have corroborated Crumley’s testimony and overall defensive theory, it was relevant and therefore admissible.