Jaimes, Yocelin Perez

Jaimes was tried for indecency with a child by contact. In addition to the statutorily required intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire, the jury charge required (for a conviction) that the State prove Jaimes intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual contact by touching a child’s breast. Jaimes objected that the jury charge’s “intent” and “knowingly” definitions should include only the nature-of-conduct portions of the terms. The judge denied this objection and gave the full statutory definitions. Jaimes was ultimately convicted. 

On appeal, Jaimes again complained of the inclusion of inapplicable portions of the definitions in the charge. The State agreed the definitions should have been limited to the nature-of-conduct element but argued error was harmless. The court of appeals held the charge was erroneous under Cook v. State, and resulted in some harm since (1) Jaimes’ mental state was a hotly contested issue, (2) the prosecutor’s argument focused on how Jaimes knew what she was doing, instead of her intent to arouse or gratify or the inappropriate touching, and (3) the prosecutor argued the jury could convict based on circumstances like Jaimes’ targeting and grooming the child when she lived with her.

The State argues that jury charges should be understood as a whole and that it should not be error to give full abstract definitions of mental states when the jury charge otherwise leaves no doubt what the mental state requires. It contends that Cook’s holding otherwise should be overruled. Even if the mental state definitions included information that might not be directly relevant, the rest of the charge included the statutory mental state (intent to arouse or gratify)—which made it plain what the mental state required and applied to—and an additional extra-statutory requirement that Jaimes also intend or knowingly engage in the sexual contact. The State argues that Cook’s required tailoring to abstract categories like nature, result, and circumstance doesn’t help jurors understand what the mental state applies to in their particular case. It leaves it up to attorneys to argue that, and often, as here, they don’t. It also contends it places too high a burden on trial judges to properly categorize elements as nature, result, or circumstance, when that categorization was never an end itself but only a guide to determine what element the mental state applies to. When that is already clear, but the category is uncertain, there is little point in still requiring categorization. For similar reasons, the State contends any error was harmless.