Mejia, Fabian

Mejia was convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon stemming from a fight in a bar parking lot.  A witness said that Mejia grabbed what from his testimony sounds like a pick axe and hit the victim in the head with the axe side.  Another witness described it as a hatchet or “work hatchet” with a claw for nails on one end and a blade on the other.  The victim remembered being hit with a weapon.  The neurosurgeon who treated the victim said he had a skull fracture and some brain bruising.  The victim was in the hospital for five days and had to relearn how to walk.

At trial, a detective testified that he called Mejia early in the investigation and Mejia admitted in this recorded conversation to being in an altercation.  When asked if Mejia admitted to using a weapon, the detective first said, “ No,” but then clarified that after telling Mejia that there was video of the incident and that he knew Mejia had something in his hand, Mejia “began to say, if I did hit him with anything— he tried to recall some kind of an object, but wasn’t able to identify what it was.”  The defense moved to admit other portions of this recording wherein Mejia said the victim threatened to shoot him if he did not get out of his truck and fight.  Mejia also told the detective that he could not remember having a weapon but that if he did, the thing that he would have grabbed was not hard enough to do the damage that was being described.  The trial court sustained the State’s objection to hearsay.  The defense did not put on any witnesses, including Mejia.  When Mejia requested a self-defense instruction, the trial court denied it because there was nothing in evidence to support it.  Mejia was convicted.

The court of appeals reversed based on the rule of optional completeness, Tex. R. Evid. 107.  By leaving out any reference to Mejia having offered some explanation for the conduct alleged, the court said, “the jury was left with the false impression that Mejia’s account of the incident included no explanation for engaging in the fight[,]” citing Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  Acknowledging that an evidentiary ruling is generally reviewed for non-constitutional harm under Rule 44.2(b), the court again cited Walters, this time for the idea that an erroneous ruling rises to the level of a constitutional violation if it effectively prevents a defendant from presenting his defensive theory.  Because “Mejia chose not to testify, . . . the other eyewitnesses to the altercation testified that they either did not hear or did not remember what was said[, and t]here is no evidence in the record of any other witness that was available to testify and heard what was said[,]” it held that Mejia was effectively prevented from presenting his self-defense claim.  The court held Mejia was harmed because the excluded evidence was sufficient to “admit” to the mental state for the offense. 

The State asked three questions, two of which were granted review.  Its first deals with Rule 107.  The State argues that Rule 107 does not contemplate requiring the admission of hearsay anytime any part of a statement comes in.  Instead, it is designed to require it only when the omitted portion is on the same subject and necessary to make the admitted part fully understood.  The “false impression” basis for admission is meant to avoid misleading the jury.  It is not triggered simply because the admitted portion does not mention the omitted part.  If it were, Rule 107 would apply in every case.  In cases like this, it would prevent the State from admitting any part of a defendant’s statement, no matter how circumscribed, without also presenting the defendant’s alleged defensive theory for him without risk of cross-examination.

The State also asks why a defendant should be allowed to manipulate the harm analysis in his favor by refusing to testify or otherwise provide the evidence to replace the hearsay that was excluded.  Not only did Mejia not testify, but his brother who was present during the fight could have testified and counsel could have asked the State’s witnesses about Mejia’s words or conduct in an attempt to support self-defense.  The decisions not to should not entitle Mejia to preferable treatment on appeal.  Further, the State argues under this point, there was no harm because Mejia was not entitled to self-defense based on what was excluded.